

# DESERT FOLLY:

BACKGROUND PAPER  
ON  
THE WAR WITH IRAQ

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## **DESERT FOLLY**

**BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE WAR WITH IRAQ**

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TO ALL VICTIMS  
OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

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## I -- INTRODUCTION: A LINE IS DRAWN

A gentle breeze rustled the tent flaps but Sir Percy was oblivious to the sound as he scrutinized his map. Picking up a pen, he scribed a line from Persia to Arabia. That, he said, will be the border of Kuwait.

General Sir Percy Cox became High Commissioner of the new state of Iraq in 1920 -- then a League of Nations Mandate under British administration. Wanting to retain a strategic presence on the Persian Gulf, yet determined to soon make Iraq an independent state, the British empire opted to keep Kuwait under the 1899 treaty with the Sabah family. Thus, with the stroke of a knightly pen, Britain carved off the cream of the region while Iraq became a nearly-landlocked country.

Events since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 have left most people confused, misled, and deeply concerned. We have now missed the alternatives to armed conflict. It is my hope that this paper may help to put the facts into proper context and support movement toward a cease fire and sensible negotiation before the conflagration spreads further.

Before proceeding, some points on the format of my presentation are in order. Traditional Arabic names can be quite long and often include the person's grandfather, father, and the tribe or location from which he or she came. For instance, the king of Saudi Arabia is named "Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud," which means Fahd who is the son of Abdul Aziz of the Saud family. (A woman would use bint -- daughter of -- instead of the masculine bin, or ibn.) Saddam Hussein's full name is "Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti" which shows that he is from near the town of Tikrit. I understand that it is common in the Arab world to simply refer to a person by his or her first name. Therefore, for sake of simplicity, but not familiarity, I shall most of the time use only the name "Saddam" when I refer to Saddam Hussein.

There are also different spellings for Arab names and places. I have tried to choose accepted spellings but in some places an alternate is shown in parentheses. For simplicity I have omitted diacritical marks (i.e. Shiite rather than Shi'ite).

Throughout the text I refer to monetary values in US dollars (\$). All oil purchased from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) must be paid for in US dollars and they are, therefore, a consistent designation of prices and costs over the years.

At the end of this paper are maps and a list of abbreviations which I'm sure will prove helpful. The maps are presented as Appendices and listed in the contents so they can be readily located for easy reference.



## II -- BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

It has been my experience that to properly understand a crisis it is necessary to study information and facts leading up to that issue. This section will deal with the political history and other basic information of Iraq and Kuwait. Since Saudi Arabia is also deeply involved in the present hostilities, I shall present material on that country.

### **A. IRAQ**

The official name is the Iraqi Republic, with the president of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as head of state (president) and the RCC chairman as head of government (prime minister or premier). The legislature is the National Assembly although in practice it is a rubber-stamp body for the President and the RCC. Iraq's flag has three horizontal stripes of red (top), white, and black (bottom); with three green, five-pointed stars in the center of the white stripe. Baghdad is the capital city of this 168,000-square-mile country. Population was estimated at 18 million in 1990. Temperatures range from freezing in January to 120 degrees F. in July and August. Average rainfall, occurring mainly between December and April, is 4-7 inches per year. The monetary unit is the Iraqi dinar which consists of 1,000 fils (50 fils equal one dirham). Arabic is the most common language but Kurdish, Assyrian, and Armenian are also spoken. Education through the sixth grade is compulsory and literacy is 70 percent. Infant mortality is 25 per thousand births and life expectancy is slightly over 56 years.

#### ***1. Geography, Culture, and Economy.***

Iraq is a landlocked country except for a narrow corridor to the Persian Gulf. Maintaining access through that corridor has been a cause of dispute for centuries. Geographically, Iraq can be described as four main regions.

(i) The Delta Region of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, rising from sea level to about 300 feet, comprises approximately a third of the country and about three-quarters of the population. This is the region most adaptable to cultivation, and irrigation is conducted with the use of canals from the rivers.

(ii) West of the Delta Region are the slowly-rising Steppe-Desert Plains which reach an elevation of 1,000 feet in the extreme west. They extend northward across the Euphrates to approach the right bank of the Tigris, and occupy much of Iraq. Here is the home of the camel-trading bedouin, and shepherds with their sheep and goats. It contains the northern and southern desert provinces but has no towns.

(iii) Next comes the Northern Foothills with greater precipitation, cooler summers, and colder winters. The scenery is

more attractive but with few trees. Annual rainfall of 14-15 inches is adequate for growing grain and providing grass for grazing.

(iv) Finally there is the Kurdish Country in northeastern Iraq which is completely mountainous with elevations up to 10,000 feet. Wild and beautiful, with severe winter climate, it is difficult to access -- an ideal hideout for bandits and guerrilla rebels. The four remote provinces in this region defy administration from Baghdad. Agrarian endeavors are mountain-top cultivation, terraced gardens, and hilly pastures. Migrating cattle-raising tribes winter low and spend summers in the highlands. The Kurdish Country is different from the rest of Iraq in race, tradition, human character, geology, economics, and living conditions.

The major cities in Iraq are Mosul, Erbil (Irbil or Arbil), Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniya in the north; Baghdad (pop. 1-million), Kut, and Amara on the Tigris; Hilla, Karbala, and Najaf on or near the Euphrates; Basra (Iraq's main port) in the south; Diwaniya and Nasiriya in lower Iraq; and a dozen or so other important towns.

Some 75 percent of the population are Arabs who are not necessarily related by blood or race, but united by a common language, religion, legend, history, and past achievement. The Kurds are about 20 percent, and the remainder are Assyrians, Turkomans, Iranians, Lurs, and Armenians. To this day the conflict between Arab and Kurd has carved a division between the modern and ancient peoples.

More friction stems from religious differences between orthodox Sunni (Sunnite) Muslims, who have usually ruled, and the more extremist Shia (Shiite) Muslims. Shias live mainly in central and southern Iraq and compose about 55 percent of the population. Sunnis dwell mostly in north central and northern Iraq, including Kurdistan, and compose about 40 percent of the population. Christians and a few Jews, Bahais, Mandaeans, and Yezidis make up the remaining 5 percent. Except for Bahrain, Iraq is the only Arab country with a majority of Shia Muslims, but they are a minority in government and in the military.

Farming is Iraq's largest industry. It exports more dates than any other country in the world -- 80 percent of global consumption -- along with wheat and barley. Cotton farming is increasing. Rice is a middle-Euphrates crop while tobacco is a Kurdish crop. But Iraq is a big importer of foodstuffs, especially wheat, rice, and soybean products. It also imports timber.

Some industry has made fair progress but cottage industries are still significant. Most of the larger factories have been nationalized under the program of state socialism. Nevertheless, Iraq abandoned collective farms in 1981 and now allows the strong incentive of private enterprise in agriculture.

The government monopolizes foreign trade and controls banking and insurance. Oil, the only significant natural resource, has been nationalized and is used to balance trade. The vast Kirkuk oil fields were discovered in October 1927. Two pipelines were built through the Syrian desert to the Mediterranean during 1931-34. The Zubair and Rumaila fields came in during 1947 and 1953 respectively. Oil from these fields was shipped through the Persian Gulf until the Iraq-Iran

war. Prior to that war, Iraq produced 3.7 million barrels per day (b/d), second highest in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). A barrel equals 42 gallons.

On 17 September 1980, Iraq denounced its 1975 border agreement with Iran and launched a full-scale invasion of that country. Oil production was cut sharply, but recovered to about 1.2 million b/d by 1984. The war caused a severe deficit in Iraq's foreign trade balance and brought on a strict austerity program aimed at reducing imports by 50 percent.

## **2. Political History.**

The area occupied by Iraq has seen the rise and fall of many ancient empires -- successive Persian dynasties as well as Roman and Greek invasions. Islamic conquest in the 7th century converted the entire country and has lasted until this day. Known as the land of the Arabian Nights during the Middle Ages, this country steadily declined under Persian and Turkish warlords, and the Mongol invasions of 1258 and 1391. Since the 13th century the land was an impoverished holding of foreign empires -- Mongol, Turkoman, Persian and finally Ottoman Turkish. Then called Mesopotamia, it consisted of three of the most neglected Ottoman provinces for the four centuries preceding World War I.

During World War I, Britain promised the Arab nations several areas of self-determination if they helped to overthrow the Ottoman Empire: (a) those Arab countries that were free before the war would remain free, (b) territories liberated by Arabs would enjoy complete and sovereign independence, and (c) the remaining governments would be based on the consent of the people. These premeditated lies were fabricated solely to elicit Arab assistance in the war. At the January 1919 Paris Peace Conference, France and Britain partitioned Asia Minor with scant cultural consideration. In dividing the spoils, three Ottoman provinces were joined to create Iraq -- part of Kurdistan (Mosul Province) was added to Mesopotamia (Baghdad and Basra Provinces) to become a British mandate under the League of Nations. Independence was granted in 1932 and the mandate became the parliamentary monarchy of Iraq with no suitable provision to protect the Kurdish minority.

A revolution led by Rashid Ali in 1941 did little to alter the form of government under King Faysal and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said. Iraq joined the United Nations in 1945 and became a founding member of the Arab League that same year.

A military coup on 14 July 1958 signaled the rise of the Arab nationalist movement, and birth of the Iraqi Republic. Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qassim (variously spelled Qasim, Kassim, and Kasim) became the ruling prime minister. His mostly-military cabinet included Colonel Abdul Salam Arif as deputy prime minister and acting minister of state. Although a republic was proclaimed, Qassim practiced virtual dictatorship -- abolishing all democratic institutions and putting down any rebellion with bloody force.

A 1960 attempt on Qassim's life by youthful Saddam Hussein and others failed. But on 9 February 1963 Qassim was assassinated during a two-day military coup. Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (Qassim's former friend) became President. There followed a slaughter of all suspected

opponents to the Baath Party, especially communists. Evidence from well-informed sources, including Baathists, indicated the US CIA assisted in ousting Qassim and then fingering various communists who were subsequently shot.

In November of that year Arif purged prime minister Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr (a Baathist sympathizer) and all Baathists from government. On 14 April 1966 Arif was killed in a helicopter crash -- some say suspiciously -- and was succeeded by his brother, Major General Abdul Rahman Mohammed Arif.

Another military coup in Iraq on 17 July 1968 returned General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr to power as president, prime minister, secretary general of the Iraqi Regional Command of the Baath party, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. A mini-coup thirteen days later, facilitated by Saddam Hussein, purged all non-Baath officials from government. From then on, the major struggles in Iraqi politics have taken place within the Revolutionary Command Council -- among rival officers and civilians jockeying for power -- and within the Baath Socialist Party itself. Purging of enemies to the regime has been a constant process. The main ballot is still a bullet.

Failing health and possibly coercion forced Bakr to resign in 1979 (he died in 1982 at the age of 68). His chosen successor was Saddam Hussein, then deputy secretary-general of the Baath Socialist Party and second in command to Bakr. Saddam had been recognized as heir-apparent to Bakr for most of the time since the 1968 coup. Some observers have speculated that Bakr was really a puppet with Saddam pulling the strings.

### **3. The Kurdish Minority.**

The Kurds traditionally live in the Mid East region called Kurdistan, with imprecise boundaries and never a viable political entity. It lies mostly in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, but also includes small portions of Syria and the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Kurdish cities of Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Mosul, and Kirkuk are in Iraq. The Kirkuk oil field, the largest in Iraq, lies in the Kurdish area. Nearby are the fields of Butma and Ain Zala.

Victory of the Ottoman Empire over Persia (now Iran) during the early 1500s brought about the division of Kurdistan. After World War I, part of Kurdistan lay in the British mandate. When Iraq became independent in 1932, four new and protesting Kurdish provinces lay within its boundaries. Kurds are sturdy people and good fighters, but their unity is sometimes strained by internal rivalries. Although also Muslims, they differ from Arabs in language, dress and customs.

Iraqi Kurds have occupied their present homes and pursued essentially the same way of life for at least 3,000 years. They have been habitually in conflict with Iraqi authorities, and are thus hostile to Arabs. They realize that the more successful Arab unity becomes, the less chance there is for Kurdish autonomy. In 1946, with the promise of Moscow's help, the Iraqi Kurds proclaimed the independent Republic of Mahabad. But it collapsed a year later because Soviet support was not forthcoming.

The Barzanis were by far the most influential tribes in recent Kurdish history. Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani founded the Kurdish

Democratic Party (KDP). An ardent Kurdish nationalist all his life, he was willing to battle for it. Mustafa first opposed British plans to include parts of Kurdistan in Iraq. When that failed he resisted the early Iraqi government under the Mandate, and was forced into exile.

After the 1958 revolution Qassim solicited Kurdish support and brought Mustafa back from exile in the Soviet Union. There were hopes of improved Arab-Kurdish relations and an uneasy truce prevailed for a while. But Kurdish insistence on autonomy persisted and clashes with police began anew in 1960. Conditions worsened into the Kurdish rebellion during 1961-63 which continued through the remainder of Qassim's rule and beyond. Iraqi troops used aircraft, tanks, rockets, and napalm but could not subdue the wily guerrillas.

A 1964 cease fire promised some recognition of ethnic demands and general amnesty, but the Kurds decided to wait and see. Another uprising occurred during 1965-66 and again ended with more talk of amnesty, ethnic considerations, a degree of local administrative authority, and some representation in government.

Still things didn't work out as promised and hostilities broke out anew between October 1968 and March 1970 -- this time with the Baathist regime. Then came the 1970 peace agreement setting up Kurdish autonomy. Saddam Hussein promised essentially the same thing as the 1966 agreement, plus recognizing the KDP as representing the Kurdish people and setting up Mustafa Barzani's 15,000 guerrillas as an Iraqi frontier force.

By 1971 there were few implementations of the agreement, and there was disagreement over revenues from Kirkuk oil. Mustafa demanded a 10-percent share of national spending for Kurdish development along with Kurdish representation in the RCC, where decisions are made, rather than in the rubber-stamp cabinet.

The 11 March 1974 deadline passed for implementing the 1970 peace plan. Saddam's insistence that the Kurds would eventually gain autonomy was rejected by Mustafa as falling too short of participation in government. A full-scale revolt immediately broke out. Baghdad deployed bombers, tanks and field guns. Iran armed the Kurds. But the March 1975 Algiers agreement settling the Iran/Iraq border dispute ended Iranian support and Mustafa ordered a cease fire. Thousands of Kurdish guerrillas hid in the mountains.

Saddam negotiated another agreement with Mustafa Barzani which proved to be just as futile. During 1975-76 Iraqi troops razed entire Kurdish villages to create a 12-mile-wide cleared zone along the Iranian border. Saddam now had a reputation for promising much and delivering little. Mustafa described Saddam as "power-hungry to the point of insanity." [Cited in Nakdimon, p. 29.]

## **B. KUWAIT**

The second player in the present Gulf crisis is Kuwait, whose official name is the State of Kuwait. It has been ruled by the Sabah family since the 1700s, and the state officials, now in exile, are:

Emir (Ruler -- also spelled amir): Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah  
Premier: Saad al-Abdallah al-Sabah  
Minister of Defense: Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah  
Minister of Finance: Ali al-Khalifa al-Sabah.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah  
Minister of Oil: Rashid Salem al-Omari

Kuwait occupies approximately 6,880 square miles and has a population of about 2.1 million -- about 75 percent being Arabs who are both indigenous Kuwaitis and immigrants. Indigenous Kuwaitis compose about 40 percent of the population. Immigrant Arabs, are about half Palestinians while the remainder are from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Many of the immigrants are skilled workers while those from Yemen and Oman are mostly laborers. Iranians are the most numerous after Arabs, followed by Pakistanis and Indians. Kuwait has experienced a huge population growth due to immigration. Sunni Islam is the main religion and outnumbers Shia Muslims by about two-to-one. Kuwait City on the southern edge of Kuwait Bay is the capital, where the bulk of the population is concentrated. The port city of Shuwaykh on the bay just west of Kuwait City handles much shipping traffic. Ahmadi Port on the Persian Gulf south of Kuwait City is the oil shipment terminal and location of the refinery.

### *1. History and Economics.*

Around 1710 a group of bedouin of the Sabah al-Khalifa tribe migrated from central Arabia to the present site of Kuwait. The grazing was good so they settled in the area. Because of the varied opportunities available on Kuwait Harbor, their occupations soon diversified to include fishing, trading, pearl diving, and ship building. Sheik Sabah in 1756 became the first known emir (ruler) and his dynasty has ruled ever since.

Under Ottoman rule Kuwait was the southern portion of Basra Province. Toward the end of the 1800s, Sheik Mubarak al-Sabah (Mubarak the Great) pressed for Kuwait's independence and the 1899 treaty with Britain recognized Kuwait as a separate country under British protection. When Asia Minor was partitioned after World War I, Kuwait was not part of the mandate that later became Iraq, but a separate British protectorate. Very soon after Iraq received its 1932 independence, Iraqi King Ghazi unsuccessfully petitioned Britain to have Kuwait annexed to Iraq.

Oil was struck at Burgan Field in southern Kuwait in 1938. Influx of wealth from oil started after World War II. One observer notes: "Having the prospect of immense future revenues, she was looked upon in many circles, in the Arab world and outside it, as an anomaly in her existing form. She ought, these critics argued, to be included in a wider federation or confederation, or, as the aggressive circles in Iraq held, to be absorbed by Iraq, where, they argued, her revenues could be used to greater advantage." [Penrose, p. 275]

Britain granted Kuwait independence on 19 June 1961, with a treaty of friendship pledging Britain's support. Six days later Qassim claimed oil-rich Kuwait for Iraq and demanded its reintegration. He denounced the British protectorate as a forged treaty bought in 1899 for 15,000 rupees, and he reminded the world that Kuwait had been an integral part of Iraq's Basra province during the Ottoman rule. Qassim also asserted that Kuwait's historical ties to Iraq were acknowledged by Britain prior to and following the 1899 treaty, and despite all evidence Britain severed the two countries.

Kuwait's known oil reserves were the largest in the world at that time, and it was the world's 4th largest oil producer. The Kuwait Oil Co., Ltd, -- owned by the US Gulf Oil Co. and British Petroleum Co. Ltd. -- supplied 40 percent of Britain's oil imports. Kuwait's income from oil was about \$3 million daily. Britain therefore warned Iraq that it would send troops at the first sign of aggression.

Sheik Sir Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, then Kuwait's emir, asserted that "Kuwait is an independent Arab state and has full sovereignty, which is internationally acknowledged," and that "the Kuwaiti people have decided to defend their independence." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1961, p. 238] The sheik on June 27th declared a state of emergency and mobilized the Bedouin irregulars to reinforce the 2,400-strong Kuwaiti army. At the sheik's request, British troops were sent to Kuwait's aid on July 1st,

Qassim's action was ill-timed and generated opposition from neighboring Arab states. The United Arab Republic (UAR -- an experimental integration of Egypt and Syria) and Saudi Arabia denounced Iraq's move. The Shah of Iran and King Hussein of Jordan sent messages of support to Sheik Abdullah. On July 2nd, at the request of Sheik Abdullah, a small detachment of Saudi troops was dispatched to Kuwait. Iraqi forces were reported massing along the border but no fighting had taken place.

After the 1963 coup in Iraq, and before the Baath Party was purged, that party negotiated an agreement which acknowledged Kuwait's sovereignty. Very shortly after that, however, a purge by the Arif regime removed all Baath Party members from office.

But the UAR deplored British intervention and urged that the dispute be solved in the Arab League. Kuwait joined the Arab League in July and requested assistance. On September 10th the League airlifted 4,000 troops (drawn from Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Sudan, Jordan, and Tunisia) to replace British troops in Kuwait. Kuwait also joined the United Nations in 1963 and became a founding member of OPEC. Iraq never invaded.

Another dispute erupted on 20 March 1973. An Iraqi force attacked and occupied a police post at Sameta, two miles inside Kuwaiti territory and overlooking Iraq's Persian Gulf port of Umm Qasr -- Umm Qasr is Iraq's oil port and lies about 20 miles inland from the northern end of the Persian Gulf. Kuwait declared a state of emergency, closed its border, and detained Iraqi citizens to eliminate the possibility of sabotage. Next day the emir sent reinforcements to the frontier. On March 24th the Kuwaiti government charged that Iraqi MIGs had violated its air space. The Arab League entered as mediator.

On March 26th some 20,000 Saudi troops were sent to assist Kuwait. On the 27th Iraqi Foreign Minister Murtada Abdul Baki claimed there is no legal basis for the existing border and that Iraq "wants to become a Persian Gulf state -- that is the crux of the border dispute with Kuwait." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1973, p. 267] Demanding that Kuwait relinquish a strip of coastline south of Umm Qasr, Baki insisted that Sameta "lies within Iraqi territory" and is vital to Baghdad because "it commands the movements of Iraqi troops in the area." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1973, p. 267] Iraq also demanded the strategically-situated and essentially-uninhabited islands of Bubiyan

and Warba which control access to Umm Qasr from the Gulf, although Kuwait never tried to block access.

Iraqi troops finally retreated from the police post but border tensions in that area remained volatile for four years, during which time there were three alleged violations of Kuwaiti territory.

Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah became the 13th emir of Kuwait on 31 December 1977. Also in 1977, the oil industry was nationalized and became the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.

Early in the Iraq-Iran war, Baghdad made a proposal to lease the islands of Bubiyan and Warba for 99 years. Kuwait rejected the offer.

Kuwait sided with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. In 1987 the Reagan administration agreed to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers to prevent attack by Iran. Kuwait had been requesting this since September 1986, but White House interest sharpened when it learned that the USSR had leased three tankers to Kuwait under protection of the Soviet navy, with additional vessels promised. Within days the Reagan administration agreed to reflag the tankers. In this manner Kuwait, encouraged by its ally Iraq, had drawn the superpowers into the war in the hopes they might end it, but it caused concern among other Arab nations.

## ***2. Military Aid To Kuwait:***

Some time in early 1984 Kuwait had requested Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the Pentagon but, after repeated refusals, Kuwait turned to the USSR. A \$327 million deal for Soviet surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles was signed on August 15th. For the first time Kuwait accepted Soviet military advisors but Kuwait's defense minister said no more than ten would be allowed.

On 19 June 1984 Pentagon sources confirmed that Kuwait had commenced receiving information gathered by US intelligence planes in the Persian Gulf. Then on December 1st Pentagon sources announced it had permission to set up a barge in Kuwait's territorial waters from which to conduct military operations -- the first US base allowed in Kuwaiti territory.

The Reagan administration announced on 10 May 1988 that it would sell Kuwait 40 F-18 fighter planes -- the first sale of F-18s to the Mid East. Then on July 7th the administration sent a proposal to Congress to sell Kuwait \$1.9 billion in arms. The Senate vetoed part of the sale involving Maverick air-to-ground missiles and the Kuwaitis threatened to seek warplanes from Britain if the deal collapsed. Two days later Kuwait signed an agreement with the Soviets to supply 245 armored personnel carriers for \$300 million.

## ***3. Domestic Problems:***

In September 1982, after climbing vigorously for several years, Kuwait's unofficial and unregulated Souk al-Manakh stock market crashed. This left over \$90 billion in gross debts -- thrice the assets of the entire Kuwaiti banking system. By March 1984 the Kuwaiti government was establishing a \$1 billion investment company to alleviate problems resulting from the crash. This conglomerate drew assets from about 125 key dealers who were declared bankrupt. The government would own up to 40 percent of the company's shares and



assets, and would back 33 percent of the shares which are fully negotiable.

On 20 February 1985, Kuwaiti voters replaced 28 of the 50-seat National Assembly -- the only elected Arab parliament in the Persian Gulf area and looked upon with suspicion by neighboring autocratic regimes. Only males of age 21 who can trace family roots in Kuwait back to 1922 can vote. The new National Assembly became more outspoken, especially regarding the ongoing inquest into the stock market crash. On May 5th, then Justice Minister Sheik Salman al-Duayj al-Sabah, a member of the ruling family, was forced to resign because of his role in the scandal.

Citing pressures from the Iraq-Iran war, Kuwaiti Emir Sheik Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah on 3 July 1986 dissolved parliament, suspended portions of the constitution, and imposed censorship of the Kuwaiti press which was considered one of the freest in the Gulf region. He said Kuwait faced a foreign conspiracy and sharp economic crisis, but a more likely reason was his chagrin over criticism of cabinet ministers who were members of the ruling family. He gave no indication as to when parliament would be revived.

A large pro-democracy movement started in December 1989. They held widespread, unauthorized meetings in private homes to map out strategy. Participants were mostly wealthy former members of the National Assembly, merchants, professionals, and intellectuals. The movement sprang up because the emir still refused to restore the National Assembly and cease media censorship. In view of the cease fire between Iran and Iraq, pro-democracy people claimed, there was no longer reason to keep parliament dissolved if Gulf tensions were indeed the reason it was dissolved in the first place.

A campaign of weekly rallies was started despite a government ban. The ruling family and other autocratic Arab regimes became concerned about the similarities of this movement to democratic overthrows in Eastern Europe. On 22 January 1990 Kuwaiti government forces used tear gas, stun grenades, and water cannons to disperse protesters, some of whom were wounded.

On 22 April 1990 the emir formed an interim National Assembly to discuss Kuwait's previous parliamentary history and make recommendations regarding a new parliament to be elected in 1994. Pro-democracy factions argued that the interim Assembly would have too many members appointed (25 appointed and 50 elected). During May 8th to 13th the government broke up demonstrations and arrested about twelve protesters, mostly former Parliamentarians. Charges were later dismissed by the emir.

The controversial elections held on 4 June 1990 for the 50 elected seats were boycotted by pro-democracy advocates. The government announced a 62-percent voter turnout -- the electorate consisted of about 65,000 males out of a total population of some 2 million people. Due to the boycott, the emir's supporters won virtually all 50 elected seats. Opponents on June 18th charged that the election was tainted with fraud.

On 9 July 1990 the newly-elected interim parliament convened. On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and the ruling family fled. From exile in Saudi Arabia the deposed Kuwaiti government in October 1990 belatedly promised reforms if they were returned to power -- that is,

reinstatement of the 1962 constitution, restoration of parliament, and free elections.

### C. SAUDI ARABIA

The third major player in the current Gulf crisis is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is the royal capital and Jidda the administrative capital. The flag is green with an Arabic text of the Shahada in white -- "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet" -- above a white sword. (Reciting the Shahada is one of the five pillars of Muslim faith.) Arabic is the official language but most Saudi officials and businessmen speak English. The monetary unit is the Saudi riyal. About 90 percent of the Saudis are Sunni Muslims, but there are small Shia groups in the east. This country is the birthplace and heartland of Islam, and the home of the Prophet Muhammad.

Saudi Arabia's head of state is the King and the head of government is the President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister). With no written constitution, law is considered decreed by Allah -- Islam is both the civil and penal code. The King's duty is to uphold Islamic law with the help of the Council of Ministers.

King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud also holds the title of Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers includes:

Deputy Prime Minister: Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud

Minister of Defense & Aviation: Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud

Minister of Finance & National Economy: Muhammad Ali Aba al-Khayl

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Prince Saud al-Faisal al-Saud

Minister of Interior: Prince Nayif ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud

Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources: Hisham Nazer

#### 1. History:

Modern Saudi Arabia had its genesis around 1744 when Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab -- under the protection of Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyah, near Riyadh -- endeavored to simplify and purify Islam. When Abdul-Wahhab died in 1792, his followers (Wahhabis, although not called that in Saudi Arabia) and the Saud family had established a desert kingdom spreading as far as Damascus. Although subdued by the Turks in 1838, a Wahhabi comeback took root and by 1870 it again had control of the highland area (Nejd) of Arabia. A rival tribe known as the Rashidis again collapsed the kingdom and caused the Saud family to take refuge in Kuwait.

In 1902 Abdul Aziz, the youngest Saud, attacked and captured Riyadh and killed the Rashidi ruler. At the age of twenty he established himself as emir and recaptured his family's prior holdings while fighting off attacks by the Ottoman empire which feared a Wahhabi revival. Conquests continued and by 1927 Abdul Aziz was recognized as the king of most of Arabia. In 1932 King Abdul Aziz, also known as Ibn Saud, proclaimed the consolidation of diverse tribes on the Arabian Peninsula as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Abdul Aziz died in 1953 and his eldest son, Saud, took the throne. Saud was forced to abdicate in 1964 and his brother, Faisal succeeded him. The kingdom flourished under Faisal and oil revenues rose rapidly. He demonstrated that strict adherence to Islamic

tradition did not conflict with economic and educational progress. Faisal was respected throughout the Arab world, and his assassination was a blow to the country. But his brother, Khaled, continued his example. Khaled died in 1982 and another brother, Crown Prince Fahd, became king on 13 June 1982.

## **2. Geography, Culture, and Economy.**

Saudi Arabia spreads over approximately 850,000 square miles, and reaches from sea level to some 9,000 feet. The country can be divided into five geographic regions -- the first four being the main political subdivisions.

(i) Nejd (highland) is in the central area and the largest region. It contains the cities of Riyadh, Anaiza, and Buraida. A gently sloping steppe rises from 2,000 feet elevation in the east to 5,000 in the west. About four inches of rain falls annually. Scrubby vegetation provides sparse feed for the flocks of nomadic herdsmen. The Nafud Desert lies in the north and the narrow Dahna Desert in the south -- both stony and sandy. Temperatures range from 130 degrees F. to nearly freezing in winter.

(ii) Hejaz (barrier) lies along the upper Red Sea coast and extends from the Gulf of Aqaba in the north to the Asir region farther south. Occupying approximately 150,000 square miles, it is separated from the interior highlands by the western mountain slopes. It contains the ports of Jidda and Yanbu (Yenbo), as well as the holy cities of Medina and Mecca.

(iii) Asir (difficult region), lying between the Hejaz and the country of Yemen, is the most populated area in Saudi Arabia. With some twelve inches of rain annually, its fertile western coastland is the wettest in the kingdom. Mountains rising from the coastal plain are terraced.

(iv) Hasa (sandy ground and water), also called the Eastern Province, stretches along the Persian Gulf. It has the oil which is the country's main source of income. Rainfall is sometimes less than four inches annually and temperatures can reach 120 degrees F. Along its coast lies the oil port of Ras Tanura and the coastal city of Dammam. This region also contains the oases of Hasa (about 200,000 people, some 60 springs, and famous for dates), and Hofuf.

(v) Rub al-Khali (the empty quarter) takes in the southern part of Saudi Arabia. It stretches some 750 miles across from the border of the Asir region to the Persian Gulf -- an immense 200,000-square-mile desert which is the largest continuous body of sand in the world. This region is uninhabited except for temporary bedouin incursions after the infrequent rains.

For the country's size there is scant population which, according to 1984 estimates, is over ten million. With little immigration the Arab ethnic composition has remained static for centuries. The cultural cross section shows 66 percent of the people are semi-nomadic, 12 percent settled cultivators, and 22 percent urban dwellers. Some ethnic minorities can be found in the coastal towns, and of course there are pilgrims going to the holy cities and foreign-worker families (some 2.5 million people) for the oil fields.

Literacy is only about ten percent and the life expectancy is a mere 30-40 years -- most of the population is under 20. Possibly the highest birth rate in the world is balanced by high infant, child, and maternal death rates.

Raising crops and herding remain the traditional occupations of most Saudis. Dates are the principal cash crop with grain sorghums from Tihama second. Dates and coffee are the only foods exported. Produce is so limited that it must be imported. Food and livestock, plus some petroleum products, constitute internal trade.

The US predominates as the country's main source of imports. Japan, West Germany, Italy, and France follow. The principle imports are motor vehicles and parts, building materials, foodstuffs, textiles, machinery, electrical equipment, and pharmaceuticals.

Discovery of oil in 1936 changed the trade balance drastically and petroleum now dominates the economy. By 1980 it was generating 90 percent of national income and accounted for 99 percent of the exports -- supplying the US, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Singapore, and Japan with oil. Saudi oil reserves are the world's largest and comprise almost a quarter of the world total. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in OPEC and second only to the USSR as the world's largest.

### **3. *Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco).***

Standard Oil Company of California (now Chevron) was granted a 60-year concession in 1933. Texas Oil Company (Texaco) joined the enterprise three years later. In 1944 the consortium's name was changed to the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (formerly Standard Oil of New York but now Mobil) became partners. Aramco was nationalized in 1976 but still jointly operated by Chevron, Texaco, Exxon, and Mobil. In addition, Getty Oil Company (owned by Texaco since 1984) has oil concessions in the former Kuwait-Saudi Arabia neutral zone (not to be confused with the present Iraq-Saudi Arabia neutral zone).

Aramco constructed a major refinery at Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf, and in 1950 completed the 1000-mile Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) to connect Ras Tanura and the Abqaiq oil field with Lebanon's Mediterranean port of Sidon. Tapline -- crossing the deserts of northern Saudi Arabia, Jordan, southern Syria, and Lebanon -- avoids the 9-day tanker voyage through the Suez Canal. A network of smaller Saudi pipelines feed into Tapline, which is now the main route for shipping Saudi oil to Western markets.

On 16 February 1988, Saudi-owned Aramco paid \$1.2 billion for 50 percent ownership in three Texaco refineries located in the eastern US, plus 50 percent of the marketing rights to 11,450 Texaco gasoline stations in the US.

### **4. *Military Aid To Saudi Arabia.***

On 22 May 1984 the US State Department revived a plan to sell 1200 Stinger (shoulder-fired) anti-aircraft missiles to the Saudis -- a \$141-million deal which faltered two months earlier under strong opposition from congress and Israel. Reinstatement was justified by the Saudi claim that Iran threatened their shipping. A week later,

citing national security interests as justification, President Reagan invoked emergency powers under the Arms Export Control Act to waive the 30-day waiting period after congressional notification, and authorized immediate sale to Saudi Arabia of 400 Stinger missiles, plus 200 launchers. This brought heavy bipartisan criticism from congress.

Also on May 29th, the administration accelerated by 3 months the delivery of auxiliary fuel tanks (to extend the range of Saudi F-15 fighter planes) along with spare parts and ammunition. By the end of the month the Saudis had 60 well-maintained F-15s and 90 F-5s.

Britain confirmed on 15 September 1985 that Saudi Arabia would buy Tornado fighter bombers, jet trainers, and related equipment. This came about after repeated US stalling, because of Israel's objection, to sell F-15 fighters to complement those already purchased. Britain finalized the \$7-billion agreement on 17 February 1986 for 72 Tornado fighter-bombers, 30 Hawk jet trainers, and 30 Pilatus PC-9 trainers -- the largest weapons-export deal in British history.

The *New York Times* reported on 4 September 1985 that according to a US State Department memo, US bases would be allowed in Saudi Arabia in the event of Soviet aggression or a Persian Gulf crisis the Saudis could not handle. The Saudis never publicly admitted this and consistently refused to engage in joint contingency planning with the US. Such close relationships would be eyed suspiciously by other Arab states.

On 7 October 1985 West Germany confirmed approval for German companies to build a multi-billion dollar munitions plant in Saudi Arabia.

Congress was notified on 11 March 1986 of administration plans to sell the Saudis 800 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 1,700 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, to supplement their existing stock.

On 30 June 1986 Saudi Arabia took possession of the first of five Airborne Warning and Command Systems (AWACS) planes originally purchased in 1981. They replaced US AWACS planes which had been patrolling there since that date.

After some wrangling with congress, the Reagan administration in October 1987 put together a \$1-billion weapons package. Half the cost was for twelve F-15 fighters to replace older F-15s as needed to keep the Saudi inventory at 60. The package also included advanced electronics for the F-15s and better equipment for M-60 tanks and artillery.

On 18 March 1988 the *Washington Post* reported that China had sold an unknown number of CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles to the Saudis. With an estimated range of 1,600 miles, the CSS-2s were now the farthest-reaching missiles in the Mid East. A faction of the US Congress on 14 April 1988 asked President Reagan to forgo the \$450-million sale of AWACS ground equipment because the Saudis had received Chinese CSS-2 missiles. The administration defended the sale on the ground that information gathered by the AWACS was shared with the US. The Saudis on 25 April 1988 announced they would sign the

nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty to ease tensions over the CSS-2 missiles.

On 27 April 1988 the Reagan administration formally announced the sale of the AWACS ground equipment, now scaled back to \$325 million, plus \$500 million worth of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and TOW anti-tank missiles.

France on 7 June 1988 announced the coming sale to Saudi Arabia of 12 Exocet-missile-equipped Super Puma helicopters and 20 fast patrol boats.

London's *Financial Times* expressed concern on 12 July 1988 that Saudi Arabia would have difficulties integrating the variety of sophisticated weapons it is buying from the US, Britain, France, and China. "This trend has got us worried," a defense attache was quoted as saying. "It definitely looks like they have got eyes bigger than their stomachs. The obsession with new weapons reminds us of the Shah [of Iran]." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1988, p. 507]

A \$4-billion weapons sale to the Saudis received congressional support in July 1990, involving 1,100 light armored vehicles, AWACS radar plane improvements, and 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles. Also \$3-billion worth of M-1 tanks was finalized. Was it only coincidence that these large sales (\$7 billion worth) were completed in time for delivery before the August 2nd invasion of Kuwait by Iraq?

After the invasion of Kuwait, even greater arms sales were announced. In August 1990 President Bush had waved requirements for Congressional review for a \$2.2-billion weapons sale. Included were 24 F-15 fighter jets, Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles along with 50 launch tubes for Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and 150 M-60 tanks.

Later in September the Bush administration announced a whopping \$21-billion advanced-weaponry sale to Saudi Arabia -- the largest arms transfer in history. This included another 24 F-15 jets, 385 Abrams (M1-A1) battle tanks, several hundred Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicles, 48 Apache attack helicopters, and 26 Patriot ground-to-air missiles. Israel expressed alarm -- seeing the chance that these weapons going to Saudi Arabia might someday be turned in its direction. In addition, the US was committed to maintaining Israel as the top military power in the Mid East. This affected congressional opinion and caused the Bush administration to falter, although it claimed that all these weapons weren't to be delivered immediately. Bush split up the package -- \$6.74 billion worth now and the balance in January 1991. That balance is now in limbo since the beginning of armed hostilities with Iraq.

### III -- PARTIES, SCHISMS, CARTELS, AND COOPS

It would be helpful to describe a few of the cooperative groups, political parties, and religious sects in the Persian Gulf region. Although they epitomize the diversity and disagreements among Arab nations, they are united on one subject -- they are unequivocally against Israel and the Zionist movement.

#### A. THE BAAATH PARTY

After the first world war there were a dozen new nations carved out of the Arabian peninsula. This brought a total of 22 active border disputes since the turn of the century, and all but one sought redress by military means. Prior to being imposed by Western nations, the Arab people had little interest in fixed boundaries. Even then, these lines remained general and fuzzy until oil was discovered.

As the colonial period waned after World War II, Arab nationalism gained momentum, the extreme of which is pan-Arab unity. Boundaries and border disputes are contrary to pan-Arab unity which envisions a single Arab state from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, without borders, an equitable distribution of wealth, and under one leader. The human element seems to enter the picture, however, when various personalities present themselves as that leader.

Gamal Abd al-Nasser (Jamal Abd al-Nasir) was president of Egypt from 1956 until his death in 1970, and a leader in one expression of pan-Arab unity called Nasserism. Under his philosophy Egypt and Syria joined in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Nasser as president. In that union, intended to be the first of many, Nasser dominated. The experiment collapsed when Syria withdrew in 1961; and Nasserism, based around Nasser's aspiration to be the leader in pan-Arab unity, folded completely in 1970 when he died.

Baathism is another approach to Arab nationalism. Unlike Nasserism, the Baath movement focuses more on party ideology so that when a dominant leader passes the movement will still continue.

Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus, founded the Baath movement in Syria in 1940. Zaki al-Arsuzi (a Nusairi -- an extreme Shia sect which has been persecuted since the 12th century, now called Alawites ) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (a Sunni) also made major contributions to the early development of Baath ideology. Baathism came into power in Syria in 1963 and permanently in Iraq in 1968. It also spread to Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Sudan and Morocco. Baathist philosophy addresses a moral and intellectual awakening of the Arabness in the people and a joining together against outsiders. Besides Arab unity the Baathists also advocate socialism, as described by Edith and E.F. Penrose:

"Arab unity was conceived of as the moral and spiritual foundation of the Arab peoples liberated from communal conflict, a kind of regenerative nationalism (hence the name

'Baath' meaning 'resurrection'). Freedom encompassed both individual freedom and national independence (hence the Baath dislike for communism, which they saw as endangering Arab national independence in a subservience either to a foreign power or to a foreign philosophy). Socialism was an ideal form of social organization existing in some sort of mystic unity with nationalism, giving progressive character to it. The teaching and philosophy of the Baath supplied most of what there was of systematic thought and doctrine among Arab nationalists. As expounded by Aflaq, it rested on great idealism and an almost religious reverence for the greatness of the Arab peoples once they had experienced the regenerative unity, a true freedom, and a just socialism." [Penrose, p. 128]

The movement grew slowly. In 1943 it had fewer than ten members but that expanded to hundreds by mid-1945. *Al-Baath*, the first party newspaper was printed in 1946. The official founding meeting on 4 April 1947, attended by 250 representatives, drew up a constitution. All of this activity took place in Syria. It was the creation of the new state called Israel in 1948, and the forced relocation of Palestinians, that prompted the Baath movement to spread beyond the borders of Syria. By 1953 there were about 500 Baathists in Syria and a few hundred in other countries.

In 1952 the Arab Baath Party combined with the Arab Socialist Party to become the Arab Baath Socialist Party which its members view as the vanguard for interdependent Arab unity. Unfortunately, Baathists tend to ignore minorities and consider everyone in their society as agreeable to being part of the Arab world.

The Baath Parties of Iraq and Syria were in 1962 conspiring to take over both governments but, because of their small size, they departed from previous Baathist philosophy to form a coalition with military factions. It has since then been the practice of Baathists to alter their thinking to fit the circumstances. Christine Helms explains how Iraqi Baathists "have applied their own view of the world ... and in doing so have departed from the highly formalized ideology developed by the original Baathists. Their actions bespeak a pragmatism not bound by ideology. Far from being monolithic, the Iraqi Baath and its leaders have shown resilience in meeting the challenge of both domestic affairs and the Iran-Iraq war." [Helms, p. 3.]

Syrian Baathists -- controlled by the Alawite faction (an extreme Shia sect) under its president, Hafiz al-Asad -- now oppose Iraqi Baathists in both philosophy and competition. Baathists military officers in Damascus had worked their way into positions of political dominance in both the party and government by February 1966. Iraqi Baathists on the other hand, after the 1968 coup, purged most military officers from the higher echelons of the party and even set up a system to spy on the military. They learned from hard experience after the 1963 coup that most takeovers are by military officers. It is a capital offense for anyone in the Iraqi military to belong to any party but the Baath.

Both Iraqi and Syrian factions now claim to have control of the National Command -- the body that coordinates the inter-nation Baath movement and the echelon of the party that Baathists intend to rule



the pan-Arab nation when full unity is achieved. In reality both countries have separate and distinct parties. It appears that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is aspiring to the pan-Arab leadership. His speeches, interpreted in this context, provide valuable insight.

The Baath Socialist Party now controls the Iraqi government through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which has both legislative and executive authority under the provisional constitution of 1968. The structure of the Iraqi Baath Party is the structure of the Iraqi government. [See Appendix A] There is a lot of overlap in personnel among the RCC, the Iraqi version of the National Command, and the Iraqi Regional Command. Although the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and at times the Iraq Communist Party, cooperate with the Baathists to some extent to form the Popular Progressive National Front, the Baath Socialist Party dominates, and the Iraqi regime tolerates no opposition.

Communism is the Baath Party's chief rival in Iraq because they are well organized and compete for membership -- and, equally antagonistic to Baathists, communists are controlled by a non-Arab, foreign power. Cooperation with communists does fluctuate, however, as Baghdad's relations with Moscow warm or cool. [For a complete analysis of the Iraqi Baath Party see Helms in the bibliography, chapters 3 & 4.]

#### B. A SCHISM IN ISLAM

Serious religious differences occur between orthodox Sunni (Sunnite) Muslims, who have usually ruled in Iraq, and the more extremist Shia (Shiite) Muslims who are actually more numerous in that country. This schism is as fundamental to Islam as the rift between Protestant and Catholic is to Christianity. It happened early on in Islamic history as a dispute over who succeeded the prophet Muhammad. Shia originally meant "party" in Arabic but has now come to be used exclusively in the religious sense as the party of Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law whom the Shias look upon as his first legitimate successor. The Sunnis affirm that the Prophet was succeeded by Abu Bakr, the first Caliph.

Shias form an overwhelming majority in Persian Iran and are the constituency for the Islamic revolutionary government of that country. Turkey, another non-Arab country, is predominately Sunni. In Iraq, the Shia are 55 percent of the population but are not represented as such in civil or military leadership. This has been a cause of internal dissension and outside provocation, the latter mostly by Iran to overthrow the secular Iraqi Baath party and form a religious Islamic government in Iraq. Other Arab countries -- the autocracies and sheikdoms -- fear the domino effect of successive Islamic governments throughout the Persian Gulf and much of the Arab world. In this manner Islam, which encompasses more than the Arab world, has been a competitor with Arab nationalism as the medium around which unity can be developed. The secular regimes can control or prohibit labor unions and professional organizations but they cannot stop the Friday worship at the mosques. That is where Shia dissidents plan their strategy.

Southern Iraq which has the greatest Shia population is also the center for al-Dawa, the main dissident movement in Iraq which is

predominately Shia. Al-Dawa is a clandestine organization that was started during the 1950s, gained impetus during the 1970s, and has received aid from Iran since at least 1978. Much of the aid comes through the marshes of Maysan Province which is populated mostly by Shia.

Among the assassinations planned by al-Dawa was the unsuccessful 1980 attempt on Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Then al-Dawa leader Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr -- known as the "Khomeini of Iraq" -- was captured and executed. Masses of Persians were deported as a means of cracking down on al-Dawa. With the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the influence of al-Dawa lessened as most Shia were then caught up in the patriotic interests of Iraq.

As part of its war effort, however, Iran picked Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim as the potential leader to replace Saddam and his Baath Party if Iran won the war and the Islamic revolution succeeded in Iraq. In November 1982, with the help of Iran, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq was set up to mount internal revolt against the Baath Party. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim became its spokesman.

Islamic unity and Arab unity both spring from the same cause -- imposition of boundaries by colonial powers and manipulation of rulers from the outside -- but they have irreconcilable objectives. Unlike mastering technology to excel in the modern world and compete with advanced secular states which is the goal of Arab nationalism, Islamic unity seeks a return to the pure Islamic nation which modern Muslims perceive in the past.

#### C. ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

OPEC was founded in Baghdad in 1960. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela (South America) were the five founding members. Algeria, Ecuador (South America), Gabon (central Africa), Indonesia (southwest Asia), Libya, Nigeria (central Africa), Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were admitted in the early 1970s, making a total of 13 members. OPEC controls about four-fifths of the non-communist world's known oil reserves.

OPEC's original purpose was to unite its members in negotiating prices with petroleum companies. But after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, OPEC ended the practice of negotiating with oil companies and began setting prices unilaterally. Their unity in pricing, however, was only occasionally successful. Wealthy nations with a vast supply of oil were quite content to have lower prices and a large volume of sales. Poorer countries and those in debt, however, depended on selling smaller amounts of petroleum at the highest price possible. In addition, some countries could produce crude oil for pennies a barrel while the expense for others amounted to dollars. (One barrel of oil equals 42 gallons. Crude oil averages about 7.3 barrels per metric ton.) These differences have caused a factional split in OPEC since its inception.

When discussing oil it is important to remember that we are talking big money. Millions are used to describe barrels-per-day production, but billions are the bracket for oil dollars. This is true whether referring to oil cartels like OPEC, or petroleum companies like Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, and Shell. These figures become

even more amazing when we recognize that some OPEC countries are run by families, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

OPEC oil is always purchased in US dollars. As the dollar advances on the world market, OPEC makes more money from countries having a weaker currency. After the 1973 OPEC oil embargo against Western nations because of their aid to Israel, OPEC raised the benchmark price from \$5.11/barrel to \$11.65/barrel. OPEC's 1973 output averaged 31 million barrels/day (b/d) -- the cartel's peak. Total world output was 55 million b/d.

A designated *benchmark* oil is the baseline for prices. Better grades of crude have a premium added, and inferior grades are discounted. Ease of transportation and cost to pump are factored in. These official prices ("futures") apply to oil that is contracted for in advance. The price of oil on the free market (sold on the spot) is usually lower. For OPEC, the benchmark is Saudi Light Crude produced by Saudi Arabia. Britain's benchmark is North Sea Brent and the US benchmark is West Texas Intermediate.

Commencing in March 1974, oil prices started a downward trend due to a worldwide recession, North Sea wells starting to produce, the USSR increasing exports, and Mexico increasing its output. But by some semblance of restricting output and cooperation from a few non-OPEC countries, OPEC's benchmark price reached \$36/barrel by 1981. At the same time world consumption fell. This did not please the Saudis who had a huge supply and could pump for pennies a barrel. They wanted higher consumption at cheaper prices so they produced over their quota -- reaching as high as 10.3 million b/d.

One way the Saudis would get around the benchmark price was to give kick backs to the US oil companies. In October 1987 the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the Aramco partners would buy crude at the OPEC base price but receive rebates if the free-market price was lower. When this came to light, other OPEC countries raised a furor and the Saudis denied the claim. However, there are many ways to get around technicalities. If direct rebates are too obvious, the operating fees paid the US companies could be raised accordingly.

From then on the benchmark price fell and so did OPEC's share of the world market. OPEC at one time departed from setting contract prices to gain a larger share of the market. By mid 1990 the price of crude oil ranged between \$14-\$18 per barrel. Negotiations over the years resulted in much friction and disagreement within OPEC.

Known world-wide petroleum reserves as of 1 January 1988 totaled 887.5 billion barrels. At the 1988 non-communist world consumption of 50.4 million b/d, that reserve will last only 48 years.

#### D. ARAB ORGANIZATIONS

OPEC was organized to represent petroleum interests rather than the pan-Arab world. Not all Arab states belong to OPEC, and some belong that are not Arab. Iran is the most prominent example of the latter but there are also Venezuela and Ecuador in South America, Gabon and Nigeria in central Africa, and Indonesia.

Two Arab organizations do not seem to have a bearing on the current Gulf crisis so I'll do no more than mention them. One is the so-called "Steadfastness Front" which was organized by Syria, Libya, Algeria, and what was then known as South Yemen, to support Iran (a

non-Arab country) in its war with Iraq. The other is the Arab Maghreb Union formed in February 1989 by north African nations: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It established a common market to oversee joint economic, educational, and social projects, with the major goal of boosting trade by allowing free movement across borders.

That brief mention will suffice for this paper. Now I shall address the three other organizations which seem to have a more direct affect on Persian Gulf states.

### *1. The Arab League.*

Officially known as the League of Arab States, it was founded on 22 March 1945 by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan (now Jordan), and North Yemen. Later members were Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was also admitted as a member to represent Palestinians. That made 22 members. When the Yemens combined on 22 May 1990, the membership was transformed to 21.

A "council" representing all members equally has authority to make decisions. Only unanimous decisions are binding on most matters but that requirement can be and has been waived. The "council" in turn forms "specialized committees" to enhance political cooperation; handle disputes and breaches of the peace; and oversee cooperation in economics, communications, social affairs, culture, and other matters.

There is also an office to oversee the general boycott of trade and communications with Israel, and with foreign firms having Israeli subsidiaries. Pursuing peace proposals with Israel which would be acceptable to the Palestinians has been a major function of the League.

Egypt was suspended from the League in 1979 when it signed a separate peace agreement with Israel. That left only 21 members (the Yemens had not yet combined). But during its November 1987 meeting the League ruled that restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt was a sovereign matter for each country to decide on its own. Several countries immediately restored full ties with Cairo, and Egypt was eventually readmitted to the League.

Disagreements have been the rule rather than the exception in the Arab League. About the only issue it has been consistently unanimous about is its position against Israel. The profusion of regional groups such as the Gulf Cooperative Council and the Arab Cooperative Council (see below) was sometimes blamed for the failure of the Arab League to achieve any degree of unity.

Egypt's first return to the Arab League in ten years was during an emergency summit in May 1989 to deal with the Lebanon crisis. Iraq and Syria were at odds over Lebanon and were in a bitter proxy war which caused the meeting to end in a stalemate. The Iraqi-Syrian dispute overshadowed the fact that Arab leaders (except Syria and Libya) supported the ongoing peace initiatives of Yasser Arafat and the PLO. Egypt and Jordan called for a resolution to eventually withdraw all foreign troops from Lebanon. Syria's 40,000 troops in Lebanon were backing Moslems in conflict with the rival Christian regime which was getting substantial arms shipments from Iraq. Saddam

was said to be motivated by a desire to punish Syria for its support of Iran during the war, and to assert Iraqi influence in the Arab world.

During the 28-30 May 1990 emergency Arab League summit in Baghdad, the League denounced US support for Israel but halted short of imposing sanctions against the US. Saddam Hussein exploited the summit to enhance his rising stature as the Arab world's most militant champion against Israel. The summit was also a show of support for Iraq in its attempt to get long-range weapons of mass destruction.

## **2. The Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC).**

Fearing a domino effect if Iran's new revolutionary government should stir up enough Shia unrest to topple Iraq's secular regime in favor of an Iranian-style Islamic government; foreign ministers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman on 4 February 1981 drew up a proposal for the Gulf Cooperative Council. The pact was initialed on March 10th and formally inaugurated on May 26th. The GCC's goal was to increase the stability of the region by coordinating security, economic and political policies. GCC members recognized their military inferiority but still resisted having to rely on Western military forces for their security.

Five committees were set up to set forth a unified policy on (a) oil, (b) economic planning, (c) social planning, (d) finance & trade, and (e) social services & culture. The common thread throughout GCC policy planning was to guarantee stability in their oil-rich region.

On 26 January 1982 the six member states agreed in principle on a defense plan for the Persian Gulf region, including an interlinked air-defense system and placing their combined military forces under a joint command to form a rapid strike force. But the members could not agree on standard weapons as Kuwait had Soviet arms while the other countries bought from the US, Britain, or France. This military alliance was a further attempt to resist superpower involvement and keep their defense a collective responsibility. Weapons manufacture in the area was also discussed. By the end of November 1984 some 12,000 troops had been assembled for a rapid strike force. Kuwait, however, defeated a proposal for a joint defense treaty.

## **3. The Arab Cooperative Council (ACC):**

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen on 16 February 1989 entered into agreement to form the Arab Cooperative Council (ACC). Saudi Arabia was apparently annoyed with Egypt over joining because the ACC was viewed as competitive with the six-member, Saudi-led GCC established in 1981. The ACC was led by Saddam Hussein for the first year.

The *London Observer* on 19 February 1989 reported that the four ACC members had also entered into a joint defense pact. The other three members had supported Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.



#### IV -- IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

Saddam Hussein [Husayn] was born in April 1937 about 40 miles northwest of Baghdad, near the small town of Tikrit on the Tigris River. Although he joined the Baathist party while in high school, his debut as an upcoming Baathist leader came in October 1959 when he attempted to assassinate President Qassim. But he only wounded Qassim, and was shot in the leg himself by a fellow conspirator. The youthful Saddam escaped on his motorcycle and fled to Damascus, Syria for temporary sanctuary. He was sentenced to death in absentia and spent some time in exile in Egypt. He studied at the Cairo University Law School before returning to Iraq around 1963 when a military coup ended the Qassim regime.

##### **A. SADDAM, THE BAAHIST STRONGMAN**

The 1968 coup put Saddam's elder cousin, General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr, in power and rose fast under Bakr's regime. Saddam, a civilian, was given the title of general and was appointed deputy secretary general of the Iraqi Regional Baath party in 1969. In 1971 he was appointed vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which is the core decision-making body of Iraqi government. Saddam effectively directed the RCC in collaboration with Bakr.

Saddam is from the same Tikrit area as Bakr -- a Sunni and Baathist stronghold. When Saddam was appointed vice chairman of the RCC, he ordered all Baathists to drop portions of their name which described genealogy or place of origin -- presumably to mask the "Tikritization" of the regime. Since Bakr chose fellow townspeople from around Tikrit for key positions in government, it was politically wise not to advertise to the Shia majority how Iraq is governed by Sunnis.

By 1973 the internal Baath rivalry became more violent than ever. Many key officers who were considered a threat to the regime were assassinated or died mysterious deaths, some in unexplained helicopter accidents. Attempted coups only months after the Baathists came to power started the progression of continuous trials and execution of spies -- often in public and frequently televised. Free speech was nonexistent. Saddam set up a security apparatus to keep track of everything -- the army, party members, police, trade and industry, schools and universities, even beyond Iraq's borders. Liquidation and torture by secret police was routine. Iraqi political leaders were keenly aware of the need for absolute loyalty by the military. The army was kept under the command of a select Sunni staff and purges of suspects were common.

During the 1970s, Saddam was the chief designer of Iraqi foreign policy. Signing of the Algiers 1975 border agreement with Iran's shah signaled Iraq's emergence from isolation, and its foreign policy was at first moderation in dealing with neighboring states. Immediately after the Algiers agreement, Iraq settled its border squabble with Saudi Arabia by establishing a neutral zone. By early 1979 the only

unresolved issue was the long-standing border dispute with Kuwait, which had stiffened over the past few years and led to skirmishes during the mid-1970s. Iraq had offered to concede on the land border in return for a 99-year lease of the two tiny islands of Bubiyan and Warba which essentially block the entrance to Umm Qasr, one of Iraq's only two Gulf outlets. Kuwait refused.

#### **1. Saddam Becomes President of Iraq.**

Saddam succeeded Bakr on 16 July 1979, the eve of the eleventh anniversary of the Baath coup. Persistent rumors throughout the Mid East have it that it wasn't a voluntary turnover prompted by Bakr's ill health, as the world had been told. Rather, that Bakr had been Saddam's puppet and it came time for Bakr to step down. The late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt said shortly after Saddam became president of Iraq: "Bakr was forced out by threats and intimidation ... Hussein wanted the presidency without delay, and Bakr, realizing that his deputy was getting impatient, was left with no choice. After having Hussein at his side for ten years, Bakr knew him to be capable of carrying out all his threats." Sadat then said with a warning shake of the finger: "That man will stop at nothing to achieve his ends." [Cited in Nakdimon, p. 32.]

To present the illusion that the rumored coup was really a Syrian-motivated plot to prevent him from achieving power, Saddam immediately proceeded to rid the government of any suspected opponents. He charged 55 high officials with conspiring against the Iraqi regime -- they were removed from a state banquet as Saddam, puffing nonchalantly on a cigar, read off their names. Some 21 senior Baathists were sentenced to death and publicly executed -- some Saddam's friends. On 8 August 1979 Saddam's regime reported that a handful of conspirators were executed by firing squad.

In this manner Saddam purged Iraqi communists from government as well as those not in sympathy with Iraq's (Saddam's) revolutionary regime. He also expelled Iraqi citizens of Iranian descent. It was not until 20 June 1980 that National Assembly elections -- promised in 1970 by the amended constitution -- were held. With opposition parties banned, government candidates had no trouble winning the vote.

In line with his reputation, Saddam threatened: "Whoever tries to lay a hand on this regime, directly or indirectly, we shall cut off his hand, he shall be struck down, because that is our right to self defense. Enemies of the regime, at home or abroad, will be destroyed by all the means at Iraq's disposal, because defense of our existence is more important than human life." [Cited in Nakdimon, p. 33.] Take special note of that quote. In the following pages we shall see that survival was the main motivation for Saddam's war with Iran. It was also the overriding reason for a military invasion of Kuwait, and domestic survival is the reason Saddam could not heed US demands that he unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait.

1979 was a significant year for Iraq in its relationships to neighboring states. Besides Saddam becoming president, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed that year caused reverberations in the Arab world which resulted in Egypt being ostracized and expelled from the Arab League. 1979 was also the year of the Islamic Iranian revolution which had serious repercussions on Iraq. Finally, 1979 was

the turning point from moderation to open aggression in Iraq's relationship to neighboring states.

## **2. The Present Iraqi Regime.**

Saddam now holds absolute power as (1) President of the Republic, (2) Premier (Prime Minister), (3) Chairman of the RCC, (4) Secretary-General of Iraq's Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and (5) Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. At the time of this writing his cabinet includes:

Vice President: Taha Muhyi al-Din Maruf

1st Deputy Premier: Taha Yasin Ramadan

Deputy Premier: Sadun Hammadi

Deputy Premier & Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tariq Mikhayl Aziz

Minister of Defense: Lt. Gen. Saadi Tuma Jubouri

Minister of Industry & Military Industrialization: Hussein Majid Kamel

Minister of Oil: Isam Abdul Rahim al-Shalabi

## **B. SADDAM'S GOOD-NEIGHBOR POLICY; WAR WITH IRAN**

Border disputes with neighboring countries continued after the first World War. With Iran the main dispute was control over the Shatt al-Arab which reverts way back to boundary disputes between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. The Shatt al-Arab is a waterway formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. It then flows 120 miles to the Persian Gulf and provides Iraq with access to the Gulf and the seas beyond. It has numerous islands which hamper navigation and it requires continuous and costly dredging of silt to maintain a deep-water channel. But that is necessary for accessing the Persian Gulf because most of Iraq's shoreline is so low that it is often flooded. Iraq wanted the east bank (Iran's side) to be the boundary so that the entire waterway would belong to Iraq, thus enhancing the movement of cargo. Iran claimed title out to the middle of the deep-water channel, to accommodate access to its ports along the estuary.

The 1975 Algiers Agreement which Saddam negotiated with the Shah of Iran was mediated by OPEC to settle a dispute between fellow members. It set the middle of the deep-water channel as the boundary in exchange for border adjustments in other disputed areas farther north. The parties also agreed to cease meddling in the internal affairs of the other -- such as inciting the Kurdish population to rebel. With aid from Iran halted by the Algiers Agreement, the rebelling Kurds in Iraq were soon squelched.

### **1. Iranian Threat to the Baathist Government.**

It would be misleading to imply that the Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute was the main cause of the Iraq-Iran war. Informed observers believe there was a deeper and more sinister reason -- a threat to the very survival of Saddam's regime. Christine Helms described the complexity of the problem:

While Iraqi claims concerning the Shatt al-Arab waterway were a prominent grievance, the deeper cause of the war was a perceived threat to the Iraqi Baathists and



to the Iraqi state arising from revolutionary Iran. On the ideological level, the opposing positions have been expressed in the extreme brand of Islamic conservatism espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and in the Arab nationalism of the Baathists." [Helms, pp. 3-4.]

Helms goes on to explain that this threat stemmed from the meddling of Iran in Iraqi internal affairs. Closely related to the above-mentioned threat to the Baathist party, she says, "was to deliver a blow sufficient to dissuade Iran from inciting dissidence among Iraqi social groups," including the Kurds, but "notably the large Shia population, among whom there are many of Persian descent." [Helms, p. 4.]

In 1978 the Shah of Iran persuaded Iraq to expel Iranian dissident Ayatollah Khomeini -- a Shia fundamentalist who had been in forced exile in Iraq for 15 years. His deportation kindled a hatred for Saddam and the Baath regime. When the 1979 revolution put Khomeini in power, he set up an Islamic government in Iran. He then incited Iraq's Shia majority -- particularly the predominantly-Shia al-Dawa dissident movement -- to overthrow Baghdad's secular government and oust Saddam. Iraq claims that in June 1979 Khomeini abrogated all obligations to the Algiers Agreement because it was negotiated by the Shah and sponsored by the US. After continuous border skirmishes and Iranian-backed assassination attempts in Iraq, Saddam denounced the Algiers Agreement and on September 22nd launched a full-scale invasion of Iran.

## *2. Saddam Invades Iran.*

It is no wonder, then, that Saddam chose Iran's oil-rich border province of Khuzistan -- historically the Arab region of Arabistan -- for his invasion. He mistakenly believed that the local Arabs would support Iraqi soldiers and cause the Iranian army to buckle. He also believed the new Iranian government was so weak that it would immediately agree to a cease fire. But resistance was fierce, and Iraqi troops were eventually forced to withdraw. Iranian-supported anti-government insurgencies by the Kurds and Shia Muslims resumed.

Jordan cut diplomatic ties with Iran on 18 February 1981 and supported Iraq in the war -- opening its port at Aqaba for Iraqi trade and later sending volunteer soldiers. Kuwait, and Qatar also supported Iraq. Syria, of course, sided with Iran -- besides being Iraq's enemy it was also governed by the Baath party's extremist-Shia Alawite faction. But by May 1982 the Persian Gulf States softened their overt support for Iraq in favor of neutrality and called for a speedy end to the conflict. In September the signals were mixed again as the Arab League proclaimed that aggression against any Arab nation was an attack on all Arab nations. Sudan then volunteered troops to help Iraq. Morocco and North Yemen agreed to provide similar support.

After the first vigorous campaigns of the war degenerated into a stalemate, Iran and Iraq tacitly agreed not to attack each other's oil-producing facilities, but that agreement didn't last long. After recapturing all the territory it had lost to Iraq, Iran in July 1982 crossed the border and tried to capture the Iraqi oil-refining city of Basra. Iraq succeeded in fighting off wave after wave of Iranian

offensives. Iraqis counter attacked in late August by bombing the Iranian oil shipping facilities on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf which handles about 90 percent of Iran's oil exports. Iraq then made increasing use of air power and surface-to-surface missiles. The fighting became a war of attrition on a 780-mile front with the line of battle not moving more than a few miles one way or the other. [For an excellent account of the Iraq-Iran war see McCuen in the bibliography.]

Iran and Iraq were both guilty of war crimes. Both had attacked hundreds of civilian oil tankers. Between February and April 1988, Iraq had fired 142 missiles at Tehran and other Iranian urban centers -- Iran had fired back with 65 missiles aimed at Baghdad and other Iraqi cities.

Iraq's armed forces grew significantly as well as its paramilitary "People's Army" affiliated with the Baath Party. Together they boasted 500,000 men by 1984. Saddam, as commander-in-chief, promoted himself to field marshal. The Iranians had the advantage of manpower (45 million vs. 15 million for Iraq) but Iraq had more modern weapons and three times the number of combat aircraft.

### 3. Chemical Warfare.

Evidence that Iraq was employing chemical weapons surfaced in March 1984 when the US State Department condemned Iraq's use of mustard gas. Iraq and Iran are both party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol forbidding use (but not production) of chemical weapons. A 7 March 1984 *Washington Post* story, based on several foreign diplomatic and military sources in Baghdad, said Iraq was manufacturing mustard gas at Samawa, south of Baghdad (on the Euphrates River and capital of Muthanna province), and that Iraq had first used the gas in July 1983 in the center portion of the war front. Then in December Iraq used it again farther north in the Penjwin hills, and had in 1984 started wide-scale use to repel Iranian human-wave attacks. The International Red Cross revealed that some 160 casualties treated in Tehran had been exposed to substances prohibited by international law. An Austrian physician, Dr. Herbert Mandl, said ten Iranian soldiers treated by him had been exposed to mustard gas. UN scientists who had examined dud bombs found on the battlefield said that in addition to mustard gas, Iraq had also employed Tabun nerve gas. In July 1984 the United Nations received from Iran a list of 24 attacks with chemical weapons by Iraq. In November US officials said Iraq had rebuilt its stockpile of chemical weapons which had been depleted in its war with Iran.

Iran launched a major offensive in March 1985, which was described as the fiercest fighting yet in the war. The Iranian force of possibly 50,000 poorly-trained "volunteers" were all killed, wounded or captured during Iraqi counterattacks. Less than a fortnight later the US substantiated that Iraq had used chemical weapons during the counterattack -- western European physicians treating the Iranians evinced that Iraq had used not only mustard gas, but also lewisite (another World War II gas) and hydrogen cyanide. In late April the UN Security Council condemned Iraq for using chemical warfare.

A UN report dated 14 March 1986, prepared by a team of experts, charged that Iraq had used chemical weapons on many occasions. This was the third UN probe during the Iraq-Iran war, but the first report

that specifically named Iraq as the villain. The experts found mustard gas to be the most common agent but nerve gas was also employed.

#### *4. Cease Fire and the Peace Agreement.*

After many years of refusing to do so, Iran on 18 July 1988 accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 -- a 10-step peace plan including an immediate cease fire. The cease fire took effect on August 20th. The main obstacle to a final peace agreement remained the Shatt al-Arab because Iraq still insisted on full control of the waterway.

Saddam by this time had massed an army of a million men and spent \$50 billion on weapons. Prior to hostilities his regime was \$42 billion in the black with the fastest growing Arab economy. At the cease fire his debt was about \$100 billion plus 500,000 Iraqis killed and two million wounded, to say nothing about Iran's losses.

A deadlock on settling the final peace agreement ensued until just days after Iraq had invaded Kuwait. With access to Kuwait's magnificent harbor the Shatt al-Arab diminished in significance. On 15 August 1990 Saddam agreed to go back 15 years and abide by the 1975 Algiers Agreement, withdraw Iraqi troops from some thousand square miles of Iranian territory, and commence the exchange of about 100,000 war prisoners. Saddam's rationale was obviously to secure his eastern border so he could focus on the US buildup to the south. Saddam was accused of sacrificing everything Iraq had fought eight years for. But of course that is not true since the threat to Saddam and the secular Baath Party had been reduced, and the perceived threat of a domino effect removed -- that is why Saddam claimed his war protected all the Arab world and insisted that other autocratic regimes and sheikdoms forgive his war debt. Also, with hostilities building up to the south, amicable relations along Iraq's eastern frontier was critical.

#### **C. SADDAM'S HUMAN-RIGHTS POLICY: THE KURDISH SOLUTION**

When the Iraq-Iran war began, Iran again supplied and supported the Kurds in their rebellion. On 29 July 1983 Kurdish guerrillas led by Massoud al-Barzani (son of Mustafa Barzani) reoccupied the garrison of Haj Omran. On 6 August 1983 Saddam tried to pacify the Kurds' nationalist tendencies by holding an election in Kurdistan for a regional legislative council with limited legislative powers. Although some progress had been made between November 1983 and May 1984, clashes between youthful Kurdish protestors and Iraqi security forces brought the talks to a halt in July. Iraqi Kurds had enjoyed some semblance of local autonomy since 1977, but the Iraq-Iran war stimulated louder demands. The major Kurdish opposition parties were the Kurdish Democratic Party led by sons of Mustafa Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan established by Jalal Talabani.

Between 1983 and 1985 Iraqi planes attacked their own Kurdish villages which were suspected of supporting Iranian military incursions or harboring guerrillas. On 15 March 1987, 57 brutalized bodies from the hundreds of Kurdish children rounded up as hostages during September and October of 1985 were returned to the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya. This was interpreted as a terrorist tactic of the Iraqi

regime to halt guerrilla activities in the north so more troops could be deployed to defend Basra.

Iraq on 16 March 1988 used chemical weapons to bomb its own Kurdish town of Halabja -- 15 miles from the border and noted for its dissent -- after it had been captured by Iran. Hundreds and possibly thousands of Iraqi Kurdish men, women, and children were killed -- 5,000 according to Iran -- in history's worst chemical attack against noncombatants. Bodies were found on the streets, in doorways, and even around a table set for lunch. Some were in cellars where they had unsuccessfully attempted to escape, and along roadsides where they had tried to outrun the gas. The chemical agent was a mustard gas and cyanide with some nerve gas mixed in.

Again on 1 April 1988 Iran accused Iraq of killing another 75 Kurds with chemical weapons. Two days later a Kurdish guerrilla leader said Iraqi soldiers had killed 400 Kurds attempting to reach a hospital after being gassed -- presumably to prevent more evidence of poison-gas use from reaching the outside world.

Just days after Iran accepted the cease fire, the Iraqi army launched a major offensive to stamp out Kurdish rebels once and for all. Some 60,000 Kurds fled to Turkey and thousands sought sanctuary in Iran. Iraq used a scorched-earth campaign -- gassing civilians, razing entire villages, and relocating whole populations. Kurdish guerrillas accused Saddam's army of slaughtering 1,300 civilians -- mostly women and children -- in the Dahuk area. They had already been gassed and were killed to prevent evidence from getting out. The US State Department on 8 September 1988 claimed to have proof of chemical attacks and denounced that action.

On 9 September 1988 the US Senate unanimously passed a bill imposing sanctions on Iraq that would suspend credit and sales and cause US representatives to international financial institutions to vote against loans to Iraq. The bill then went to the House but the Reagan administration, wishing to avoid further damage of relations with Baghdad, labeled the sanctions premature.

Iraqi Defense Minister at the time, General Adnan Khairallah, told reporters on 15 September 1988 that Iraq reserved the right to use whatever means it deemed necessary to deal with the Kurdish "traitors" who had supported "the Iranian enemy." While Iraq was opposed to using poison gas, he said, "each rule has an exception." But he also suggested that using gas would not be logical because it would pollute the Iraqi army's own lines of advance. [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1988, p. 670.]

A Paris parley of 149 nations, including Iraq but not the Kurds, was held on 11 January 1989 to condemn the use of chemical weapons. Iraq maintained that the conflict with the Kurds was purely an internal matter and not a war, and therefore was not subject to the Geneva Protocol.

On 9 April 1989, according to Kurdish sources, surrounding Iraqi troops ordered the 100,000 residents of the Kurdish city of Diza to move out within seventeen days as the city would be razed at that time. Three days later the *Financial Times* of London said that in spite of global protest Iraq had gained military control over the Kurdish border zone by relocating between 100,000 and 500,000 Kurds and bulldozing or dynamiting their homes. This was the culmination of the offensive begun in 1988 after the cease fire with Iran. The new

homes for refugees were located in well-guarded plains and valleys, away from the mountains so conducive to guerrilla activity. Before that, refugees were sent to die in the desert area.

#### D. SADDAM'S EXTERNAL DIPLOMACY AND INTERNAL HOUSEKEEPING

Iraq had severed diplomatic relations with the US during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War because of US support for Israel. The new Reagan administration sent an envoy to Baghdad in early 1981 to explore resuming diplomatic relations. President Reagan in April 1981 approved the sale of five new Boeing jetliners to the Iraqi Airline, and bilateral trade reached \$1 billion in 1982. Iraqi-US relations warmed during the Iraq-Iran war as the US secretly supplied satellite intelligence data. In December 1983 Reagan sent a personal note to Saddam and Saddam agreed to continue contacts between the two countries. Full diplomatic exchanges between the two countries were restored on 26 November 1984, but in a carefully couched statement the US still asserted military neutrality in the war.

Jordan's King Hussein attempted to thaw Iraqi-Syrian relations by calling a meeting of their foreign ministers on 13 June 1986, but that failed and the meeting was cancelled.

It was reported on 16 October 1988, after the Iraq-Iran cease fire, that Saddam was moving against some of his own military officers who he thought posed special threats. A top commander, Lt. Gen. Maher Ahmad Rashid was reported under house arrest and two other generals met suspicious deaths in helicopter crashes. During mid-December the US State Department said there was evidence of unrest among Iraqi army officers. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, a coup attempt against Saddam in February 1989 led to the execution of a number of senior army officers.

In November 1988 Saddam ordered an investigation and trial of his eldest son, 24-year-old Uday, for beating a presidential guard to death during an argument. Such publicity was extremely unusual. Uday was released during the inquiry but London's *Sunday Times* and the *New York Times* reported in late March 1989 that Saddam's power base may have been weakened. Uday's mother had asked Defense Minister General Adnan Khairallah -- her brother and Saddam's cousin -- for help. Khairallah (considered up until this time as the #2 man in Iraq) was put under house arrest. He was killed in a helicopter crash on 5 May 1989. Amid speculation that it was no accident, bloody fights occurred between Saddam's and Khairallah's clansmen in Tikrit, the home town of both men.

Amnesty International on 28 February 1989 reported that over the past few years the Iraqi regime had arrested, tortured, and executed hundreds and possibly thousands of children of political dissidents and political opponents -- many Kurdish but some Arabs. Children were tortured to make them reveal information about parents and relatives, and in the parents' presence to make the parents talk. Families were allegedly forced to pay for the bullets, coffins and transportation used. Amnesty International also accused Iraq of "deliberate massive killings" of school children, often Kurdish, in public to punish villages for dissident activities. [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1989, p. 270]

On 29 March 1989 Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed a nonaggression and mutual noninterference pact. This agreement was presumably aimed at easing fears among Persian Gulf Arabs about Iraq's regional ambitions following its war with Iran.

Thousands of Egyptian workers returned from Iraq in November 1989 with stories of terror, brutality, and unexpected deaths. Some 135 corpses were also returned -- many from the arms plant explosion the previous August but some had bullet wounds.

Amnesty International on 30 January 1990 reported that Iraqi troops, apparently looking for army deserters, had attacked dozens of villages in southern Iraq, populated mainly by Shia Muslims and center of the clandestine al-Dawa dissident movement. Many civilians were killed. Middle East Watch (another human-rights group) charged on February 10th that Iraq is "a well-organized police state" and "one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in the world today." Their report added that Iraq "denies its citizens virtually all basic rights and ruthlessly suppresses even the small gesture of dissent." The report documented "forced relocation and deportation, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary political execution." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 210]

#### E. SADDAM WOODS THE WEAPONS MERCHANTS

Although formerly more dependent on the Soviet bloc for arms -- half of Iraq's conventional arsenal came from the USSR -- Saddam in the mid-1970s started courting Western sources. In the early 1980s France placed second to the USSR as a weapons supplier. Shortly after the Iraq-Iran war started, France claimed a prior commitment took precedence over neutrality and in February 1981 delivered the first four of 60 Mirage fighter-bombers to Baghdad. France had also previously agreed to sell helicopters, tanks and Exocet missiles to Iraq.

Moscow had decided on neutrality at the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war but the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor reversed that decision. During the suspension Iraq had resorted to buying arms from Poland to replenish its mainly-Soviet-furnished weapons inventory. In July 1981 the USSR resumed arms shipments to Iraq.

Egypt and Iraq moved closer diplomatically during 1981, and Egypt agreed to supply arms and ammunition but not troops. An Iraqi high-level delegation visited Egypt in March 1982 to solicit additional aid. By mid-July there had been \$400 million worth of Egyptian-made arms shipped to Iraq. Some 1.3 million Egyptians were working in Iraq during 1983 and about 15,000 were helping in Iraq's war effort.

##### 1. Building the War Machine.

By early 1982 Iraq was again receiving war materials from the USSR, and had petitioned Britain for anti-aircraft missiles. Technology and Development Group (TDG) near London, an Iraqi front company, and its subsidiary, Matrix Churchill in Coventry north of London, supplied Iraq with precision machine tools needed for Saddam's missile and nuclear programs.

Also by early 1982, Saddam had arrived at an agreement with France for artillery and surface-to-air missiles. Czechoslovakia,

China, South Africa and Brazil also furnished Saddam with weapons. Iraqi spokesmen again voiced hopes of trading with the west -- including the US since Reagan had the previous month removed Iraq from the list of terrorist nations which were not to be supplied with arms.

France in June 1983 agreed to sell Super Entendard jet bombers to Iraq. Super Entendards carrying Exocet missiles were Argentina's most effective weapon during the 1982 Falklands war. Five Super Entendards arrived in Iraq the following October. France was more deeply involved in the Iraq-Iran war than any other Western country, having sold Iraq about \$5 billion in military and other equipment and trained Iraqi pilots at a French air base. France in August 1983 agreed to loan Iraq another \$1 billion for French-performed construction and development projects in Iraq; such as airports, hospital, communications facilities, and water supplies. Another half-million dollars was added in early 1984.

In January 1984 Iraq took delivery of 500-mile-range, truck-mounted SS-12 (Scaleboard) missiles from the USSR. During October the Iraqis built up their defenses with new Soviet tanks. (In April 1989 Iraq announced it was producing its own advanced version of the Soviet T-22 battle tank.) Many German companies have exported arms and technology to Iraq, including the deadly fuel-air explosives (FAE) technology for Iraq's Condor missile project and extending the range of Soviet-supplied Scud missiles to reach any capital city in the Mid East. Saddam also attempted, but failed, to buy 10,000 TOW anti-tank missiles from an Orlando, Florida middle man.

During the Iraq-Iran war, a German company built a network of several dozen underground bunkers to provide housing and command posts for Iraq's top military leaders. These bomb shelters have five-foot-thick walls of reinforced concrete and are so deeply buried that they can withstand the blast of an earth-penetrating warhead.

Between 1982 and 1986 a consortium of six Belgian companies (Sixco) built eight sophisticated and hardened underground air bases for Iraq. Each facility is about four miles square. The hangars are protected with 20 inches of reinforced concrete topped with another twenty inches of desert clay reinforced with lime. There are also underground personnel bunkers, ammunition bunkers, fuel tanks, dual power supplies, and criss-crossing runways.

On 30 March 1990 British officials raided a British company in Scotland and northwest England which had tried to smuggle acoustic detonators for naval mines to Iraq. Iraq's army is claimed by some to be the fourth largest in the world.

## *2. The US Share of the Market.*

On 18 October 1984 the US confirmed that it was considering an Iraqi request to buy 45 Chinook helicopters which had been made in Italy under US license. They were exportable as civilian vehicles but could be used militarily. A company called Alcolac in Baltimore exported 538 tons of thiodiglycol through a circuitous route to Baghdad -- thiodiglycol is the main mustard gas ingredient. Alcolac pleaded guilty to a technical export violation and was fined \$430,000. The owners then sold the company and disappeared. Global Research International of Washington, D.C. was involved in providing uniforms and helicopters for Iraq. Survival Technologies Inc. applied in 1988 to

sell one million acutane injectors (a nerve-gas antidote) to the Iraqi army.

From January 1980 through April 1990 the US Commerce Department approved 99 percent of all license requests for exporting to Iraq -- some three-quarter billion dollars worth. Since 1985 there have been 486 export licenses to Iraq approved, many for dual-use equipment that could be converted for the military. On the day of the Kuwait invasion 160 such licenses were pending. Iraq's acquisition program has not been minuscule. Shipment of high-speed electronic testing equipment useful in missile and nuclear programs was approved. In mid-1990 there was a request to ship a supercomputer to a Brazilian team helping Iraq with its ballistic-missile program, and which could also be used in Iraq's nuclear program. Lindberg Heat Treating Company of Chicago in September 1990 had Commerce Department approval to ship seven rocket motor case sections to Brazil, although Brazil is still helping on Iraq's missile program.

Contributing to the accuracy of Iraq's missiles, including the extended-range versions of the Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, were imaging enhancement systems to analyze satellite photos and determine targets, obtained from International Imaging Systems of Milpitas, California. The company admits furnishing such systems, purportedly for civilian use, in 1981 and 1987. According to Steve Bryen, a former Defense Department officer, an imaging system for Iraq was also licensed for export by the Commerce Department in February 1990. [Cited in Banmiller.] That deal was never consummated. Hewlett Packard in 1985-86 sold computers to a German company but knew the ultimate destination was Iraq. HP also sold some computer equipment directly to Iraq. Wilton Company of Morgan Hill, California, sold microwave communications testers to Iraq and Tektronix of Beaverton, Oregon, sold that country graphics design terminals and other equipment. During the three years leading up to the Kuwait invasion, the US Commerce Department had approved some \$700 million in sales to Iraq. During the mid-1980s the sales were even more vigorous. [San Jose, CA *Mercury News*, 16 January 1991, p. 1C.]

According to Robert C. Johansen and Michael G. Renner in 1985, the US proclamation of neutrality in the Iraq-Iran War was inappropriate and untrue. The US had tacitly supported Iraq's invasion, had shared military intelligence, and had offered economic assistance. Not only had the US strived to restrain Iran, it had sought to gain influence over the Iraqi leadership. [McCuen, pp. 116-117.] A 15 December 1986 *Washington Post* story revealed that for almost two years the CIA had been supplying Iraq with secret intelligence information, including sensitive spy satellite photos, which have helped Iraq in planning air raids on oil terminals and industrial facilities. One reason that Saddam could later withstand the US air war against him in early 1991 was because his understanding of US satellite intelligence photo capability allowed him to hide his military machine.

On 11 January 1987 the *New York Times*, citing intelligence sources, said the Reagan administration had given both Iran and Iraq distorted or inaccurate intelligence information to prevent either side from winning, and to enhance US objectives. CIA spokesman George Landers called the report "false," and US State Department officials insisted that Iraq had been given good information. A



subsequent report by the *Washington Post* citing Western officials and analysts said information supplied to Iraq was essentially sound. [Facts on File, 1987, p. 26] Apparently only Iraq was mentioned as having received accurate information.

### **3. Missiles, Germs, and Gases.**

On 30 November 1988 Iraq announced a successful test of an anti-tactical ballistic missile designed to shoot down incoming missiles.

A US House of Representatives panel was told during September 1989 that Egypt had ended participation with Iraq and Argentina in the effort to build a medium-range missile based on Argentina's Condor-2, and that Iraq was behind the project with the intentions of fitting it with nuclear or chemical weapons. The Iraqi version is called the Badr-2000, but is more commonly referred to as the Condor. Although it would have a range of 750 miles, accuracy is only claimed out to 250 miles.

The 6 October 1989 *Financial Times* reported that, apparently under British pressure, an Iraqi-controlled company had dropped plans to purchase a Belfast, Northern Ireland defense factory. British fears that the factory could make composite materials for the Iraqi Condor-2 missile squelched the deal.

It was reported on 21 November 1989 that Iraq had received sensitive missile technology information from West Germany, France and Italy through a sly network of European front companies.

Two American rocket scientists were sentenced on 5 December 1989 to 46 and 41 months in prison for conspiring to smuggle sensitive information to Egypt which would help its Condor-2 missile program with Iraq.

On 7 December 1989, Iraq announced that two days earlier it had launched a three-stage, 48-ton rocket which could put a satellite into orbit, making it the first Arab country capable of such a feat. It was named *Tammuz* (July -- the month Baathists came to power). The missile was launched from a space research center in Anbar province, west of Baghdad, and could also be used as a long-range ballistic missile. Iraq claimed it had developed two new surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1,240 miles that posed a threat to Israel (which also has a long-range missile and a satellite-launching capability).

During 1988 and 1989 the American Type Culture Collection, a nonprofit repository of biological organisms, sold Iraq strains of anthrax and botulism toxins. Thus with the official sanction of the US Commerce Department Saddam obtained lethal bacteria for his biological warfare program. US officials in January 1989 confirmed that Iraq was developing arms to spread such diseases as typhoid and cholera. Iraqi ambassador to the US, Abdul Amir Anbari, denied that his nation had built a biological warfare plant. But Radio Luxembourg reported that West German scientists, along with those from East Germany and Cuba, had helped Iraq establish a germ warfare factory in the village of Salman Pak, south of Baghdad. US CIA Director William H. Webster, in late September 1990, revealed publicly for the first time that Iraq does have a large stockpile of biological weapons. These weapons contain live viruses to spread deadly diseases such as typhoid, cholera, botulism, and anthrax. Biological warfare is

considered worse than chemical weapons which are detectable and dissipate quickly -- biological weapons can be delivered covertly and the effects linger for years.

A 29 March 1984 dispatch in the *New York Times* said that according to US intelligence reports the Karl Kolb Scientific and Supply Company of Frankfurt, West Germany had for two years been furnishing pesticide chemicals and equipment to Iraq. These were apparently used for nerve gas production. West Germany's economics ministry confirmed the report. On 30 March 1984 the US Customs agent at Kennedy International Airport impounded 74 drums of potassium fluoride, used to make nerve gas. They were destined to Baghdad.

In mid-August 1989 an explosion leveled a secret Iraqi military plant at Hilla, about 60 miles south of Baghdad. According to the *Times* of London on September 6th, Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani said many of the dead bore injuries similar to those of Iraqi's chemical weapons victims, and that the dead and injured exceeded 2,000. The British *Independent* reported that same day that 500 engineers and workers were killed, some Egyptian, and that one-third of the complex was destroyed. It also said that the plant was engaged in research to extend the range of Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles.

Iraq has four plants producing chemical and biological warfare, four sites involved with testing and developing missiles, and at least four locations are pursuing uranium enrichment or plutonium extraction.

It was revealed during August and early September 1989 that the Atlanta, Georgia branch of Italy's largest state-owned bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), had made unauthorized loan commitments to Iraq which were later determined to total 2.867 billion. The branch manager was only authorized to loan \$500,000 per customer and the higher amount had not been cleared with superiors. Large portions of these loans could have been used to purchase equipment with military potential. Some examples are: XYZ Options Inc. of Tuscaloosa, Alabama received a \$14-million contract for precision carbide tools; ABB Lummus Crest in New Jersey built an ethylene plant in Iraq for \$58.8 million -- ethylene is used in the production of chemical warfare agents; and TDG through its affiliate, Matrix-Churchill, (both mentioned above) received \$16 million for precision lathes and other equipment to support Iraq's Condor-2 missile program. These companies are owned by the Iraqi-dominated TMG Engineering. Due to US bureaucratic bungling the letters of credit were not stopped.

#### **4. Saddam's Big Gun.**

British customs officers announced on 11 April 1990 that they had intercepted an Iraq-bound shipment of eight sections of precision-made steel tubing which could be used as part of a huge cannon to lob nuclear or chemical warheads several hundred miles. The eight tubes, totaling 131 feet (40 meters) long, were smooth bore of 39 inches (1,000 mm) diameter. The tubes were made by Sheffield Forgemasters, as were 44 similar sections previously shipped to Iraq. Another steel maker, Walter Somers Ltd., was also involved in previous shipments to Iraq. The specifications for such a gun were identical to those in a 1988 technical manual on high-altitude, large-caliber guns of which Gerald Bull was a coauthor.

Ballistics scientist Gerald Bull's company, Space Research Corp., had been publicly associated with the December 1989 launch of Iraq's 1,240-mile-range missile. Space Research Corp. also had expertise in long-range artillery pieces and had acted as Iraq's agent in dealing with Forgemasters and Walter Somers. In the 1960s Bull headed a joint US-Canadian military program which built three monstrous prototype guns for hurling rocket-boosted projectiles for vast distances. He then went into the international arms trade and spent six months in a US jail for violating the arms embargo against South Africa. Later he and his company continued to contract to South Africa as well as Iraq, Iran, Israel and other countries. In 1989 a Space Research Corp. subsidiary and an Iraqi company were forced by the British to drop plans to operate a defunct defense plant in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Bull was assassinated on 22 March 1990 outside his apartment in Brussels, Belgium.

The 18 April 1990 *Financial Times* reported that British and Belgium officials had evidence that a Belgium defense company -- Poudriere Reunie Belge, now owned by the British company Astra Holdings PLC -- had contracted with Iraq to help build rocket-boosted projectiles for a giant gun in cooperation with companies associated with Bull. On 19 April 1990, following Bull's murder, Space Research Corp. announced that it was going out of business for security reasons. Bull's son said this decision was based upon his father's death, and not because of the gun-tube disclosures.

#### F. SADDAM'S QUEST FOR THE BOMB

Rear Admiral Thomas a. Brooks told the US House Armed Services Committee on 22 February 1989 that Iran, Iraq, and Libya were all actively pursuing a nuclear capability. On March 31st the *Washington Post* said Iraq was engaged in a secret crash program to develop and build atomic warheads for strategic missiles, which were also in development. Completion of the program was expected in 2-5 years with the missile program being closer than the warhead. This information came from unidentified Israeli sources who also said the nuclear weapons project was partly funded by Saudi Arabia and was given limited technical assistance by Pakistan.

##### 1. The Soviet Research Reactor.

Iraq's first attempt to obtain a nuclear reactor capable of manufacturing plutonium was with the USSR. In December 1959 ten Iraqi students started a four-year course in nuclear physics in Moscow. A year later an agreement was signed for the Soviet government to construct a small IRT-2000 research reactor at Tuwaitha (Tuweitha), about twelve miles southeast of Baghdad. In the meantime, gifted Iraqi students were also enrolling in Western universities to study nuclear science. The Soviet 2-megawatt reactor was completed on 6 January 1968 and was eventually upgraded to 5-megawatts. But that was still too slow for a crash nuclear program and Soviet surveillance made the accumulation of plutonium from such a program impossible. Moscow would go no further so Saddam had to look elsewhere.

In 1969 Iraq signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, making its nuclear activities subject to International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. By so doing, Iraq would be viewed as having less-ominous ambitions in its pursuit of the atom. Saddam knew that he need only give three months notice to withdraw from the treaty after the reactor and high-grade uranium fuel had been obtained.

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War it became obvious that Israel was fast approaching a nuclear capability. This put new urgency behind Iraq's program. Then Iraqi Atomic Energy Commissioner, Dr. Haari Award, said: "We are dutybound to mobilize our finest scientific and technical resources and provide good working conditions, so as to take the Arabs into the atomic era. As long as we do not construct atomic reactors to produce atomic fuel, we shall be unable to declare, 'Indeed, we have entered the atomic era.'" [Cited in Nakdimon, p. 44.]

## *2. The French Osirak and Italian Hot Cells.*

France was the most receptive to Iraq's courtship, with oil as a dowry. In December 1974 French Premier Jacques Chirac accepted then Vice President Saddam's invitation to Baghdad. There followed a series of closely-guarded secret negotiations in which Saddam got everything he wanted. The Osiris material-test reactor -- named after the ancient Egyptian god of hell and death -- surfaced as the only one available with the capacity for plutonium production suitable for an atomic bomb program. Construction began after the final agreement was signed in August 1976, with a completion date in 1981. The dual Osiris reactor to be furnished Iraq was called Osirak. Saddam said in 1979, "The struggle against Israel will be arduous and prolonged. In its course it is even feasible that Israel will attempt to use an atom bomb against Arabs. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the Arabs to prepare all the means necessary for victory." [Cited in Nakdimon, p. 106. For a well-written description of how this program evolved, and the secrecy surrounding it, see Nakdimon in the bibliography.]

Immediately after the deal with France was finalized, Saddam started negotiations with Italy to obtain "hot cell" laboratories which could be used to extract weapons grade fissionable material. These hot cells also played an important function in allowing Iraq to accommodate IAEA inspections. IAEA officials must give several weeks notice before an inspection and in that time Iraq could move all evidence of bomb-making activities from the reactor site for storage in the hot cell laboratory. Hot cells, by some quirk of IAEA bureaucratic imagination, escaped inspection requirements, even when they exist with a reactor which in itself is the most suspicious combination.

In a surprise attack on 7 June 1981, using 14 US-made F-15 and F-16 aircraft, Israel bombed the nearly-complete Osirak nuclear reactor near Tuwaitha. Israel contended that the French-supplied plant was to produce atomic bombs for use against Israel. Many nations denounced this act, and the Arab League on June 11th condemned the raid but took no stronger measures against Israel, a US ally. The UN Security Council added its condemnation on June 19th. Later reports suggested that the raid was really a cover operation so that Israeli saboteurs on the ground could set off more-damaging blasts. After the attack, neither IAEA inspectors nor French officials

were allowed at the destroyed plant. Also after the attack, Saddam dispersed his nuclear-research facilities throughout the country and fortified them.

The Osirak nuclear plant, begun in 1976, was previously sabotaged in 1979 while still under construction. The reactor was destroyed but France replaced it in return for increased oil shipments. The first shipment of 90-percent-enriched uranium reached Iraq in July 1980.

### 3. Regaining Lost Ground.

After the bombing, France said it would reconstruct the Osirak plant if Iraq agreed to strict IAEA safeguards. (France in August 1987 denied that it had committed to rebuilding the reactor.) Saudi Arabia offered to finance the cost and Portugal volunteered to provide 130 metric tons of uranium -- it had already sold 120 metric tons to Iraq in 1980. Iraq supplies about 40% of Portugal's oil purchases. Iraqi officials announced in March 1984 that the USSR had agreed to build Iraq's nuclear power plant.

Almost nine years after the attack, on 2 April 1990, by which time Iraq had acquired longer-range missiles, Saddam threatened to wipe out half of Israel with binary chemical weapons if it tried another attack on Iraqi facilities. This was the first referral to Iraq having binary weapons which up to then had only been possessed by the US and USSR. According to the *New York Times* on 29 March 1990, Iraq had for the first time built fixed launchers for these missiles within ranges of the capitals of Israel (Tel Aviv) and Syria (Damascus). Other Arab nations applauded this tough talk and Saddam's strong-man image was enhanced.

The *Washington Post* reported on 5 May 1989 that the US Commerce Department had stopped an Iraq-bound shipment of vacuum tubes from CVC Products, Inc. of Rochester, New York -- tubes which could be used in the production of nuclear fuel. CONSARC, a New Jersey company, wanted to ship high-temperature furnaces to Iraq that could be used in Saddam's nuclear program, to melt the zirconium used to clad nuclear fuel rods, but the White House stopped it. US and British officials in late-March 1990, after an eighteen-month sting operation in London, broke up a smuggling ring by which Iraq could obtain US-made electronic devices (capacitors) which could be used to trigger nuclear bombs. A British company, known as Euromac, Inc. with offices just outside London, was involved. It was actually an Iraqi front. Five people were arrested by British customs agents before the devices could be put aboard an Iraqi airliner at Heathrow Airport. Euromac in September 1988 had contacted CSI Technologies, Inc. of San Marcos, California about purchasing custom-made capacitors. CSI became wary when the specifications were exactly as required for atom bomb triggers. CSI informed customs officials and a sting was set up. Euromac also broached the possibilities of obtaining kryptons -- special electronic switches -- which are also used in nuclear bombs.

According to the *Financial Times*, Euromac is part of a wide network of shadowy front companies in Europe set up for the purpose of obtaining sensitive Western technology for Iraq's various nuclear/chemical/biological programs. This network was supposed to

have been funded by \$1 billion of the \$2.867 billion in unauthorized loans to Iraq by the BNL branch in Atlanta, Georgia.

Iraq also owns part interest in a Swiss company which is suspected of having shipped parts to Baghdad which can be used for the extraction of Uranium.

### B. THE VAGARIES OF FATE

When I think of the greedy behavior of the weapons merchants around the globe -- people who will do anything to turn a profit -- my meditation goes back almost a half-century to when I was in combat on the island of Luzon in the Philippines. I was given a poem one day. I don't know who wrote it, but he was a soldier in the Pacific Theater during World War II. It expresses so much of what I felt at that time, and still feel, and to that unknown doughboy I extent the literary credit.

#### The Vagaries of Fate

I've been waiting a long time my darling,  
Till we'd meet in the valley some day.  
But heaven will see our next meeting.  
I've been shot down in Manila Bay.

The Shikis roared out of the darkness,  
With Delaware powder in each shell.  
May God up in heaven take vengeance,  
And burn all the DuPonts in hell.

There are sky-blue planes in the heavens,  
Pratt & Whitney engines in each one.  
And Hamilton props do the driving,  
For the ball that means the Rising Sun.

The high-test fuel in their gas tanks,  
Was drilled in a Golden-State well.  
Let's pause and set down one more black mark,  
For Standard, Union and Shell

The shrapnell picked out of my comrades,  
Was junk from Seattle shipped to sea.  
I wonder if the men who made the money,  
Knew what their scrap iron would be.

Years ago on the far western prairies,  
When the Indians weren't shooting for fun.  
Our soldiers, with muskets and sabers,  
Faced Winchester's best repeating guns.

Let's hope that some day we'll take warning,  
Not sell out to our foes o'er the foam.  
And a soldier shot down in battle,  
Won't feel that the lead came from home.

Yes, let's hope that some day we'll take warning!

## V -- THE PILLAGE OF KUWAIT

Voice of America in early 1990 called Iraq a police state and urged the overthrow of all dictators, including Saddam. When a US Senate delegation visited Baghdad on April 12th, Senator Robert Dole apologized for the broadcast and assured Saddam that President Bush doesn't support a campaign against Iraq. The US State Department confirmed that it was not reassessing its overall policy toward Iraq. When Dole returned to Washington he advised the White House that Saddam was a leader the US might be able to work with.

Congress was not so happy with Iraq, however, and was considering sanctions. But Egypt on June 26th asked for more time to try to influence Saddam.

### A. PRELUDE TO DISASTER

Since the 1988 cease fire, Iraq had doubled its efforts to obtain the latest military technology and, more recently, had been outspoken in threats against Israel and Western nations. Of its 18-million population, one million were in the military. Saddam in 1990 further asserted himself as the Arab nation's strong man by telling an American newspaper interviewer on June 28th that war was "inevitable" if the US doesn't halt Israel from carrying out anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab policies. "We shall respond to an Israeli attack whenever it comes and wherever." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 567] During July he threatened the use of force against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) if they continued to drive oil prices down by producing more than their quota assigned by OPEC -- high prices were essential to Iraq's recovery from its war debt. This belligerence sparked mediation efforts among Arab nations, a warning from the US, and general concern among the public.

#### *1. Arguing Over the Black Gold.*

Iraq has the world's second largest known oil reserves -- 100 billion barrels -- which makes it a key power in OPEC. Oil exports provide about 95 percent of Iraq's trade revenues. With oil profits down some 20 percent from the \$15.5 billion netted in 1989, Iraq's ability to acquire advanced technology has been hindered. Petroleum overproduction by Kuwait and the UAE was viewed as the main reason for Iraq's loss of oil income. Furthermore, over half of Iraq's remaining \$80-billion wartime debt was to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE. Saddam insisted that those countries forgive the debt because of Iraq's sacrificed to protect them from the fundamentalist Shia expansionist policies of Iran.

During his July 17th speech on the 22nd anniversary of the coup that put the Baath Party into power, Saddam charged that some Gulf countries had been "inspired by America" to overproduce in order to keep prices low. This accusation was directed toward Kuwait and the UAE. "If words fail to protect Iraqis, something effective must be

done to return things to their natural course and return usurped rights to their owners," he said. "Iraqis will not forget the maxim that cutting necks is better than cutting the means of living. Oh, God Almighty, be witness that we have warned them." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 549]

The next day Iraq publicized a letter from Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to the Arab League which charged that Kuwait and the UAE were participating in an imperialist-Zionist plan to depress crude oil prices. The letter also accused Kuwait, over the past decade, of having stolen some \$2.4 billion worth of oil from Iraq's southern oil field of Rumaila by slant drilling across the border, and having in 1980 built military outposts on Iraqi land. Rumaila holds about a quarter of Iraq's oil reserve but Iraq never pressed this claim previously.

Kuwaiti emir, Sheik Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, responded by sending envoys to Arab capitals, calling a preliminary session of its interim parliament, and putting the 20,000-man Kuwaiti armed forces on alert. On July 19th the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Sheik Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah (the emir's brother) wrote to the Arab League saying that "Iraq has a rich record of violations of Kuwaiti territory, a record backed by facts." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 549]

## **2. Urging Calm, Aggravating Turmoil, and Sending Mixed Signals.**

Saudi King Fahd and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak immediately urged Iraq and Kuwait to settle their dispute by brotherly dialogue. Meanwhile, the Iranian press (formerly so critical of Iraq but still an advocate of restricting oil output to keep prices high) on July 22nd said, "a means of punishment against quota violations seems a necessity," and that Kuwait and the UAE had "made so many enemies through their past irrational behavior that they should expect little or no sympathy from other producers at the upcoming [OPEC] ministerial session in Geneva." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 549]

On July 23rd a government-controlled Iraqi newspaper attacked the Kuwaiti foreign minister by saying "Sabah al-Ahmad's malignant hand is behind all the harm inflicted on Iraq, and he acted as a tool to implement American policy in Kuwait." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 549-550] Britain and the UN Secretary General urged all parties to remain calm.

On that same day Arab and American officials announced that Iraq had massed some 30,000 troops along its border with Kuwait -- detected two days earlier by a US KH-11 spy satellite. That number later grew to 100,000, one-tenth of Iraq's total troops which is the largest army in the Arab world. Most observers thought this buildup was more to intimidate Kuwait prior to the OPEC meeting than preparing for war. Egyptian President Mubarak left the next day for Baghdad and, at the UAE's request, the Bush administration sent US aerial refueling planes to participate in emergency training with UAE fighters. A six-warship US Navy task force was also still on permanent assignment to the Gulf. This was the first time the UAE had openly cooperated with Pentagon military activities but, apparently concerned about Iraq's accusations of being influenced by America, the UAE claimed it was only technical training and certainly not a joint maneuver.



US State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler on July 24th made a statement that Saddam could have interpreted as assurance that the US would not interfere if he invaded Kuwait. She told a news conference: "We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait." [Cited in ABC documentary "A Line in the Sand".] She did add that the US does support the individual and collective defense of its friends in the Gulf. Nevertheless, the mixed signals could have encouraged Saddam.

On the following day, Saddam told US Ambassador April Glaspie, "Assure the Kuwaitis and give them our word that we are not going to do anything until we meet with them.... But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death." [Cited in "A Line in the Sand."] Ambassador Glaspie replied to Saddam that, "The President personally wants to expand and deepen the relationship with Iraq.... We don't have much to say about Arab-Arab differences like your border differences with Kuwait. All we hope is that you solve these matters quickly." [Cited in "To The Brink Of War."] Again, Saddam undoubtedly took that as encouragement to move against Kuwait.

Egyptian President Mubarak reported that same day, after his meeting with Saddam, that he had arranged for talks between Iraq and Kuwait in Jidda, Saudi Arabia as an effort to solve their oil and border disputes. Mubarak also emphasized that Saddam had assured him, Mubarak, that Iraq had no intentions of invading Kuwait and that anti-Kuwait propaganda in Iraqi newspapers would be stopped. (After the invasion, Saddam claimed he had only promised Mubarak he would not invade Kuwait until after the Jidda talks.) Mubarak sent a message to President Bush by way of US Ambassador Glaspie, stressing Saddam's peaceful intentions and desire to avoid a confrontation with the US.

Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly, during congressional testimony on July 31st, gave Saddam another false cue that the US would do nothing about a Kuwait invasion. He refused to hypothesize on contingency actions but again affirmed the absence of any treaty commitments to engage US forces.

On July 27th OPEC raised the crude price from \$18/barrel to \$21/barrel, with Iraq acting as unofficial military enforcer to dissuade any overproduction. This was a compromise between the Iraq-Libya demand of \$25/barrel and the Kuwait desire to maintain \$18/barrel. Iran was Iraq's silent partner in this debate because, like Iraq, Iran also needed oil revenues for its post-war economic revival. Saudi Arabia was somewhat cautious about Iraq's saber rattling but did back the price hike. This put the three largest producers in OPEC -- Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia -- in relative harmony to plan the cartel's future course. OPEC's production ceiling was raised to 22.5 million barrels/day, which was still below actual output. However, OPEC still faced a bloated worldwide oil inventory and it didn't expect the \$21/barrel price to be reached before the end of 1990.

### *3. Tough Talk from Congress, Apathy in the White House.*

Meanwhile, legislators in Washington wanted to impose sanctions on Iraq, but State Department spokesman Richard Boucher advised that

"the situation today is that we believe the kinds of legislative measures now under consideration would not help us to achieve US goals with Iraq." [Cited in "A Line in the Sand."] And the Bush administration still would not act on CIA reports that more than 100,000 Iraqi troops were amassed at the Kuwait border. In addition, White House strategists apparently felt comfortable with the fact that throughout history there has never been an invasion or occupation of one Arab country by another.

On the afternoon of August 1st, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, briefed the Pentagon. According to *Washington Post* reporter Rick Atkinson, "Schwarzkopf gave a rather vivid description in somewhat low-key manner of what the Iraqi forces were capable of doing. He did not predict that there would be an invasion. There were no alarm bells that went off. The Chiefs went out of there and went back to their business." [Cited in "To The Brink Of War."]

The Iraq-Kuwait talks in Jidda took place on August 1st but collapsed after only two hours of vitriolic argument. Iraq demanded that other Gulf nations write off some \$30 billion of Iraq's debts, that Kuwait and the UAE pay Iraq \$14 billion to compensate for driving the oil price down, and that long-standing border disputes be resolved in Iraq's favor. The latter included giving the strategically-located islands of Bubiyan and Warba to Iraq. Kuwait seemed agreeable on fiscal matters if Iraq would recognize Kuwait's sovereignty but was adamantly against any border adjustments. On this note both parties walked out.

## **B. BY LAND, SEA AND AIR**

At 2:00 AM local time on 2 August 1990, Iraqi tanks and infantry surged across the border into Kuwait. The Iraqi Air Force provided cover and other assault forces came by sea. There was virtually no resistance. The airport, key roads, and major areas of Kuwait City were quickly secured. The emir fled by helicopter to Saudi Arabia but his younger brother, Sheik Fahd al-Ahmad al-Sabah, was reported killed. Kuwait's ambassador to the US, Saud Nasir al-Sabah, requested military aid. Iraq threatened to turn Kuwait and Iraq into a graveyard if any outside power intervened.

World oil prices shot up August 2nd and financial markets plunged. Rising oil prices occurred in spite of near-record stockpiles of petroleum worldwide. West Texas Intermediate rose to \$23.11/barrel, and then \$28.31 on August 7th. But the following day, amid speculation that OPEC may boost oil production, West Texas Intermediate fell to \$25.96/barrel.

### **1. The First Days.**

Baghdad claimed to be responding to a call for assistance from Kuwaiti revolutionaries who had overthrown the Sabah family (which had ruled Kuwait for 2-1/2 centuries). Iraq said it would withdraw forces "as soon as things settle and when the free provisional government asks us to do so.... We hope that this will be a matter of a few days or a few weeks at the latest." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 566]

Iraq-controlled Kuwaiti radio on August 4th announced a new "popular army" being formed which was open to all nationalities. It said that the "provisional government" (which had allegedly requested Iraqi intervention) had set up a nine-man military cabinet. [Facts On File 1990, pp.581-2] Exiled Kuwaitis claimed the cabinet members were all Iraqis.

On August 5, the new Iraqi-imposed foreign minister of Kuwait, Walid Saud Abdullah, warned that "Countries that resort to punitive measures against the provisional Kuwait free government and fraternal Iraq should remember that they have interests and nationals in Kuwait." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 582] Foreigners in both countries were rounded up and strategically placed at key military installations as so-called human shields.

Saddam that same day ordered formation of 11 new army divisions to augment his million-strong armed forces.

## **2. Province Number Nineteen.**

On August 6th Saddam said the invasion of Kuwait was "necessary" to redraw colonial boundaries which had left a huge wealth from oil in the hands of a "corrupt minority" of Arabs. [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 583] Some observers say the invasion was designed to make Iraq an economic superpower to compliment its military might. Iraq and Kuwait together hold a known oil reserve of 195 billion barrels -- over a quarter of OPEC's total and 20 percent of the world supply. By invading Kuwait, Iraq nearly doubled its 100-billion-barrel oil reserves. That is second only to Saudi Arabia's 257-billion-barrel reserve which comprises a quarter of the world total.

These sound like good reasons to invade, but are they paramount? Was the invasion a means of ending a border dispute? Was it retaliation against Kuwait for driving oil prices down, or for siphoning off oil from Iraq's Rumaila oil fields? Or was it to better distribute the massive Kuwaiti wealth which is a goal of pan-Arab unity? The media for the most part offers all these conditions as reasons for Saddam's invasion; but Farzeen Nasri, a political science professor in Santa Barbara, CA, doesn't agree that they stand alone. He postulates that any and all of these grievances could have been settled short of an invasion which sparked global protest. According to Nasri, the only reason Saddam risked negative world opinion by invading Kuwait was, again, a matter of survival. After a prolonged, unpopular and costly war with Iran, in which he was saved by arms trade from the Soviet Union and Western nations, there was nothing gained but massive debts and general destitution. He could not demobilize the huge army because that would saturate the already unstable economy and aggravate unemployment. Two thirds of the country's food was being imported and Kuwait was demanding repayment of its war debt. The situation was not conducive to Saddam's popularity and conditions were ripe for a coup.

Saddam saw that invading Kuwait would solve many of the outstanding problems but, most of all, it would unify the country behind another foreign excursion which would overshadow domestic problems. Nasri points out that this is not a novel scheme of Saddam's but a trick that had been used by Bismark, Stalin, Khomeini,

and others. Furthermore, two-thirds of the Kuwaiti population were not citizens but performed all the dirty work in that nation. Saddam saw the opportunity of gaining their support by giving them citizenship and a share of the wealth. But Saddam's plans went awry when the emir of Kuwait managed to escape and set up a government in exile. [For a full discourse on reasons for the invasion see Nasri in the bibliography.]

Only six days after promising to withdraw forces soon, Saddam formally annexed Kuwait on August 8th as the 19th province of Iraq. He justified this act by claiming the provisional Kuwaiti regime requested to return to "the mother homeland" in a "comprehensive and eternal merger" of the two countries. Saddam added, "Thank God that we are now one people, one state that will be the pride of the Arabs." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 583]

Iraq officially sealed its borders, only allowing foreign diplomats to leave. Concern mounted among US officials for the safety of some 3,000 American citizens stranded in Kuwait and about 500 in Iraq. Reports over the ensuing week indicated that US, French, British, West German, and other foreign citizens had also been detained. Britain alone had about 4,000 citizens in Kuwait and 1,000 in Iraq.

Two Presidential decrees by Saddam were published August 28th. The first officially annexed Kuwait as the 19th province of Iraq and renamed the capital as Kadhima -- the name of Kuwait City when Iraq and Kuwait were together in the Ottoman Empire. The second decree sliced a strip off of Kuwait's northern border area which included the Rumaila oil field and the virtually-uninhabited islands of Bubiyan and Warba. The islands are mostly mud flats but they block direct access to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, which had been undergoing expansion. This strip was named Saddamiyat al-Miylaa, to honor Saddam, and was attached to the province of Basra. One Kuwaiti refugee claimed seeing fences being constructed to delineate the boundary of Saddamiyat.

### 3. Securing the Eastern Frontier.

During the August 10th Arab League meeting, Saddam (speaking from Baghdad) surprised his Arab colleagues with a diatribe about the "Moslem masses" launching a "holy war" to purge foreign troops and "corrupt" Arab rulers. He said, "The colonialists ... set up those disfigured petroleum states. Through this, they kept the wealth away from the masses of this nation ... Oh, Arabs, oh, Moslems and believers everywhere, this is your day to rise and defend Mecca, which is captured by the spears of Americans and Zionists.... Burn the land under the feet of the aggressive invaders.... Expose all collaborators and agents and defeatists and support Iraq." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 597] Observers have taken note of the increasing degree with which Saddam invoked Islam to further his cause, notwithstanding the fact that Iraq is mostly a secular government and Saddam's Baath party in mostly socialist and nonreligious. This was obviously a peace overture toward Iran and its ideology of Islamic unity.

In a surprise move, Saddam offered a final peace agreement with Iran on August 15th which gave that country virtually everything it wanted. Saddam agreed to abide by the 1975 Algiers border agreement, withdraw Iraqi troops from Iranian territory, and start the exchange

of some 100,000 prisoners of war held by both sides. This was obviously an act of necessity by Saddam to secure his eastern frontier and free the troops guarding it so he could concentrate on the US buildup to the south. It was also speculated that he hoped to open a route for trade through Iran so he could circumvent the UN embargo. This capitulation did, however, leave him open to criticism that he gained nothing from the long and costly war. However, with the annexation of Kuwait the Shatt al-Arab waterway, now heavily-silted and cluttered with sunken ships, lost its importance in providing access to the Gulf. In his letter to "Dear Brother President" of Iran, Saddam told Ali Akbar Hashmehi Rafsanjani that "everything you wanted ... has been realized," and that he, Saddam, looked forward to "a new life in which cooperation prevails under the shadow of Islamic principles and that each of us respects the rights of the other and keeps away those fishing in muddy waters on our shore." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 599] Iranian Foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati that same day called Saddam's proposal "the biggest victory of the Islamic republic of Iran in its history." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 599]

Although Iran stuck by its initial condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait, Tehran's attitude apparently mellowed toward Baghdad after Saddam gave in on the Shatt al-Arab. Later, on September 12th, Iran's supreme religious leader called for a holy war to combat the foreign military buildup.

## C. GLOBAL CONDEMNATION AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

President Bush blasted Iraq's incursion as an act of naked aggression and immediately reversed his position by imposing economic sanctions. He said, "This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait." [Cited in "To The Brink Of War."] Bush froze Iraq's and Kuwait's US holdings. About 8 percent of US oil imports came from Iraq, which amounts to approximately 3.6 percent of American petroleum consumption. Kuwait provided around 1 percent of the oil imported into the US, less than half a percent of the petroleum consumed. Congress quickly approved the embargo but chastised Bush for opposing Congress' earlier attempt to impose sanctions against Iraq.

### 1. The World Reacts.

Britain and France also froze the foreign assets of both countries. Switzerland said it would prevent Kuwait's holdings from falling into the hands of Baghdad. Kuwait had something like \$100 billion invested abroad -- most of that in the US, Japan, and Europe -- and the emir's returns on investment exceeded oil revenues. NATO and the European Community denounced Saddam's actions and called for a quick withdrawal.

The Soviet Union, Iraq's largest arms supplier, cut off military shipments and denounced the invasion. Most of Saddam's small arms, planes, missiles, and tanks had come from the Soviet Union. The next day, August 3rd, the US and USSR issued a joint statement demanding immediate withdrawal from Kuwait.

Israel denounced the Iraqi invasion and called for sanctions, but it was relieved that the world could now see that Saddam was a regional menace. Israel was also pleased that this new Gulf crisis lessened demands for Israel-Palestine peace talks.

The 12-nation European Community on August 4th joined in imposing economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait -- including banning oil imports and freezing assets. The EC imported about 11 percent of its oil from Iraq and Kuwait.

Japan added its trade embargo against Iraq and occupied Kuwait on August 4th. This included oil imports which was difficult for a country entirely dependent on imported oil with 12 percent of its supply coming from Iraq and Kuwait. China, Iraq's #3 arms supplier after the USSR and France, joined in to halt weapons sales to Iraq.

Turkish President Turgut Ozal, in compliance with UN sanctions, said on August 7th that his country would bar ships from loading Iraqi oil at its Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik. That was a difficult decision as Turkey gets half of its oil from Iraq. Iraq had reduced the flow of oil via the twin pipelines through Turkey on August 6th because of the growing world boycott. Iraq's Persian Gulf ports were in such bad shape following the war with Iran that about 90 percent of its oil exports go through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, also, refused to load Iraqi oil onto ships at Yanbu, and refused to offload any cargo bound for Iraq.

## **2. Arab Nations Regroup.**

For the first time in modern history, one Arab nation had invaded another. Arab nations were stunned and at first only called for a diplomatic solution without foreign intervention. Arab countries in the Gulf area presumably feared to irritate their aggressive neighbor. Egyptian President Mubarak was highly-embarrassed after Saddam had promised there would be no attack on Kuwait. Iraq also was a threat to Saudi Arabia in spite of the two countries having signed a nonaggression pact in 1989.

An emergency Arab League meeting at first failed to initiate any action. But on August 3rd the League waived its requirement of unanimity (Iraq was not present) and approved a resolution condemning "Iraqi aggression against Kuwait." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 582] Fourteen of the 21 members were in favor of the resolution. Jordan, Libya, the PLO, and some of the League's poorest members either opposed the resolution, abstained from voting, or were not present.

The six-member Gulf Cooperative Council on August 3rd also condemned the invasion, as did Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria. President Hafez al-Assad -- Saddam's bitterest rival -- put Syrian armed forces on alert. Jordan's King Hussein, once considered one of the most pro-Western Arab leaders, was not so ready to criticize. Recently he had been moving more in line with Saddam. Likewise for the PLO and the Palestinians. Most European nations, Japan, and Canada joined the US, France and Britain in freezing Iraqi-Kuwaiti assets.

Twenty of the Arab League's 21 nations (Tunisia was absent) gathered in Cairo on August 10th. Again abandoning the requirement of unanimity, they voted 12:3 to send troops to Saudi Arabia and, if necessary, any other states in the Persian Gulf to protect them from

an Iraqi attack. (Iraq, Libya and the PLO voted against the resolution. Jordan, Sudan, and Mauritania voted in favor but with reservations. Algeria and Yemen abstained.)

The *New York Times* reported on August 14th that Egyptian President Mubarak's success in mustering Arab opposition to Saddam had apparently garnered him higher respect in his country. Egyptian friction with Iraq has several nuances: (1) resentment that Saddam is trying to make Baghdad the cultural and political center of the Arab world instead of, for instance, Cairo, (2) Egyptians still remember the physical and financial mistreatment experienced by guest workers in Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war; and (3) the lies Saddam told, and President Mubarak to his later embarrassment believed, about having no intentions to invade Kuwait.

Troubles attributed to the Kuwait invasion rose within the PLO. Like Jordan's King Hussein, PLO-leader Yasser Arafat had increasingly linked his organization with Iraq in recent times since Saddam seemed to be the strong-man Arab to counter Israel. This alliance had in turn offended Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other rich Arab states around the Gulf that had given a billion dollars a year to the PLO over the last decade.

### 3. Initial United Nations Resolutions.

The United Nations Security Council on August 3rd immediately issued a unanimous condemnation and threatened mandatory sanctions if there was not an immediate and complete withdrawal.

On August 6th the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661 by a unanimous 13:0 vote, imposing a wide range of economic sanctions on Iraq until it withdraws from Kuwait. Yemen and Cuba abstained. Yemen is the only Arab nation on the Council's 10 rotating members (The five nuclear powers -- US, USSR, Britain, France, and China -- are permanent members and have veto power). Resolution 661 called upon all 159 member states to halt all trade, transportation connections, and financial/commercial dealings with Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Medicine and food for "strictly humanitarian circumstances" were the only exceptions. [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 582] This was only the third time in its history that the Security Council had imposed economic sanctions, and this time was by far the most severe -- the other times were against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa.

The UN Security Council unanimously (15:0 with Yemen and Cuba voting in favor) passed another resolution on August 9th declaring the annexation of Kuwait as "null and void" under international law. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that same day blasted the Iraqi invasion as "the most vile aggression known to the Arab nation in its modern history." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 597] Iran also denounced Saddam's takeover of Kuwait as an "illegal, baseless action," and said that "Iran will not tolerate any alteration of the political geography of the region." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 599] Iran was, however, benefitting from the higher oil prices caused by the crisis.

## VI -- FROM SHIELD TO STORM

President George Bush, in his unique approach to obfuscation, said regarding military force: "We're not ruling any options in, but we're not ruling any options out." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 566] The USS Independence was ordered to move its carrier task force from the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Sea near the mouth of the Persian Gulf -- the existing US navy force in the Gulf had already been strengthened by eight warships.

US intelligence detected some 100,000 Iraqi troops mobilizing south of Kuwait city near the Saudi border on August 3rd. On August 4th Iraqi troops had entered the former neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from which both countries pump oil. There were also intelligence reports that Iraqi warplanes had been deployed to Yemen on the south end of the Arabian peninsula.

### A. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

After discussions with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner -- and after using US spy satellite photos to convince Saudi King Fahd of the threat to his country -- President Bush on August 6th ordered the first of 200,000 US military personnel and warplanes to Saudi Arabia to protect US oil interests there (Aramco interests -- Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, and Mobil). This was considered the biggest overseas US buildup since Vietnam and was quickly dubbed the first post-cold-war crisis. Bush vowed that US forces would not withdraw until Iraq pulled out of Kuwait, saying that "the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait. America does not seek conflict but America will stand by her friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive ..." [Cited in "To The Brink Of War."]

#### 1. A Defensive Operation Only.

This initial deployment received strong bipartisan support throughout the country and in Congress. Had Saddam overrun Saudi Arabia he would have had control of 45 percent of the world's known oil reserves. There was, however, deep concern about Iraq's chemical weapons of which Saddam had demonstrated a willingness to use.

The *Washington Post* reported that the president had also ordered covert US operations to overthrow Saddam, based on CIA information that Saddam was a threat to US security.

From the Arab viewpoint, it was considered a bold move for the Saudis to openly and quickly invite US involvement. The 66,000-man Saudi armed forces were mostly US-trained and were equipped with billions of dollars worth of US equipment. Nevertheless, the Saudi government had repeatedly refused to allow US bases in their territory, even during the greatest threat from Iran during the recent war. The Arab world was sharply divided over the invasion of



Kuwait and were hesitant to openly criticize Saddam. Most Arabs were astounded at the blatant action but paused at opposing Iraq's military strength and Saddam's growing Arab popularity. Bush's initial attempt to get a token Arab representation in the Saudi buildup was not fruitful. Even moderate Arab nations like Egypt held back. US officials did announce on August 7th that Egypt and Morocco would send forces to Saudi Arabia but both countries declined public confirmation.

The first US forces took off for Saudi Arabia on August 7th for the operation dubbed Desert Shield. The full headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM -- formerly the Rapid Deployment Force) was relocated from Tampa, Florida. The initial deployment also included some 2,300 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; F-15 jet fighters from Langley AFB, Virginia; B-52 strategic bombers; and F-111 fighter-bombers which had previously been moved from England to Turkey. In addition to the eight-ship US navy contingent in the Persian Gulf and the carrier USS Independence in the Gulf of Oman (which puts its planes within range of Kuwait and Iraq); the carrier task forces led by the Eisenhower in the Mediterranean and the Saratoga in Florida, along with the cruise-missile packing battleship Wisconsin were also dispatched.

At the request of King Fahd, Britain on August 8th sent air and naval forces to the Gulf. Britain so far was the only nation to immediately send forces to bolster the US. Meanwhile, the carrier Eisenhower steamed through the Suez Canal to go on-station in the Red Sea.

Bush broadcast nationwide that same day: "Four simple principles guide our policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every president from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad." None of these principles mentioned protecting the oil supply which was his original reason for deploying US troops. Nevertheless, Bush continued: "Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.... *The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities.*" (Emphasis added.) [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 583]

In a later news conference the president announced that "a line has been drawn in the sand," but emphasized, "We're not in a war." He also said the use of chemical weapons "would be intolerable ... would be dealt with very, very severely." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 583] Saudi King Fahd told his subjects on August 9th that US forces "are here to help defend the kingdom ... and will leave as soon as the kingdom so demands." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 597]

President Bush formally notified Congress on August 10th that he had deployed US forces to Saudi Arabia earlier in the month. He described this notification as consistent with the War Powers

Resolution, but he did not actually invoke the 1973 law which would give Congress a voice in handling the emergency.

In response to the Arab League's decision, Egyptian and Moroccan troops were expected to make up most of the pan-Arab representation with 5,000 men from each country. They began arriving in Saudi Arabia on August 11th. Syria contributed troops to the Arab contingent on August 14th. Syria, along with Iraq and Egypt, has one of the Arab world's strongest military. Economically-impooverished Syria's willingness to align itself with the US, although a bitter foe of Iraq and economically dependent on Saudi Arabia, seemed to signify that it was striving to extricate itself from isolation.

On August 13th, Pakistan (not an Arab nation) agreed at the request of King Fahd to send troops to Saudi Arabia. It already had a contingent of possibly 5,000 technicians and military instructors working for the Saudis. The Soviet Union on August 17th expressed willingness to furnish military forces toward a joint force under the UN flag, if the Security Council took action against Iraq.

During mid-August the Bush administration accelerated arms sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia and was seriously considering new requests for weapons from other Mid East nations such as Bahrain, Turkey, Oman, Morocco, and the UAE. The administration had notified Congress of intent to sell Egypt 46 F-16 fighters and Maverick air-to-surface missiles for a sum of \$1.6 billion. And the president had waived congressional restrictions against supplementing the Saudis' 60 F-15 fighters with 12 new ones. (See Saudi Arabia section above for previous weapons sales from the US, USSR, and France.)

The USS John F. Kennedy left Norfolk, Virginia for the Mediterranean on August 15th to be the fourth aircraft carrier within range of Iraq and Kuwait.

## *2. The First Offensive Glow to Bush's Policy.*

Bush on August 16th said: "Our action in the Gulf is about fighting aggression -- and preserving the sovereignty of nations.... And we are also talking about maintaining access to energy resources.... Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world." [*Facts on File*, 1990, p. 600.]

On August 22nd, Bush ordered the activation of 49,703 reserves -- the first call up since the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. The President can activate as many as 200,000 reservists for a period of 90 days without a declaration of war. Some Air National Guard crews and planes were already airlifting troops to Saudi Arabia. In addition, 38 wide-bodied commercial jetliners were commandeered -- half cargo and half passenger -- to ferry troops and supplies to the Persian Gulf.

By August 26th some 45,000 US service personnel had been sent to the Gulf under the Commander in Chief of CENTCOM, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. This was now the largest overseas deployment since Vietnam and the most intense airlift since World War II.

Saudi King Fahd announced on August 30th that his government was going to buy gas masks for every civilian and foreigner in the country. Two Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary and Bulgaria, the next

day expressed interest in a US-brokered deal to provide that equipment.

It was announced on September 10th that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait's government in exile, and the UAE -- the three biggest overproducers of oil prior to the crisis -- would contribute a combined \$12 billion through the end of 1990. Half would go to the US for the cost of Desert Shield and the rest to bolster the economies of Egypt, Jordan and Turkey which have suffered a loss in sales from the embargo. The European Community also promised \$1.5 billion to help Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Japan added \$1 billion to offset military expenses and another \$3 billion to Arab states that were hurt economically by the embargo. West Germany agreed to pay about \$2 billion -- \$960 million to offset US military expenses, \$610 million worth of military equipment, and \$430 million in economic aid to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. Germany and Japan cannot send troops because of their post-World War II constitutional restraints.

During his address to a joint session of Congress on September 11th, Bush added a new item to his growing list of goals in the Gulf: "To curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and, above all, nuclear technologies." [*Facts on File*, 1990, p. 671.]

America's Arab allies publicly proclaimed that Desert Shield was only for defensive purposes to prevent further expansion by Saddam, and that economic sanctions should be given time to work. But in private these same Arab allies urged a massive US strike to smash Saddam and destroy his arsenal of chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and other long-range instruments of mass destruction. They did not favor an end to the crisis which would allow Saddam to retain his military strength. It seems that these private persuasions had an influence on President Bush because he adopted a much more hawkish attitude in events that were to follow.

### *3. War Drums Sound as the Buildup Continues.*

US Defense Secretary Cheney announced August 20th that the UAE had agreed to US military forces operating from their land. In a September 3rd story, the *New York Times* said that US aircraft were already secretly deployed in the UAE as well as Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. This was consistent with a previous August 14th report in London's *Financial Times* that the Gulf Cooperative Council was putting their facilities at the disposal of US, British, and French armed forces.

Counting some 190 paratroopers in the UAE, France's total commitment to the Gulf as of September 15th was some 13,000 troops, 14 ships, and about 100 anti-tank helicopters. During mid-September Argentina sent a small force of 450 men, Canada sent a squadron of CF-18 fighter planes, and Italy sent eight Tornado aircraft. Syria also pledged to supplement its 4,000 troops (3,000 in Saudi Arabia and 1,000 in the UAE) with another 15,000 men and 300 tanks. In late September, Britain upped its troop commitment by sending its Seventh Armored Brigade -- the Desert Rats -- consisting of 8,000 troops and 120 Challenger tanks. Britain's Royal Air Force also dispatched a second squadron of Tornado ground-attack fighters and six Tornado air-defense fighters.

By the end of October the US count was 240,000 troops in the Gulf region or enroute. On October 23rd, Bush hinted at deploying beyond that figure and on the 25th Defense Secretary Cheney revealed plans to send another 100,000 troops and 700 additional tanks to counter the increasing Iraqi buildup. That would bring the US buildup to 340,000 personnel, 2,000 tanks, 500 combat aircraft and 59 warships.

In early November, after the elections, the ante was raised. Bush doubled the additional troops to 200,000, the battleship USS Missouri, and three more carrier task forces led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt, the USS America, and the USS Ranger. The carrier USS Independence was brought home. The US commitment was now some 440,000 troops, six aircraft carriers, and two battleships. Tanks and combat aircraft increased proportionately.

By mid-November the total multi-national force committed to the Gulf reached 600,000 troops, 940 combat aircraft, and 147 warships. By comparison the peak buildup in Vietnam was 543,000 troops, excluding naval forces off shore. Iraq had 550,000 troops and 500 combat aircraft near the border.

## B. USE OF FORCE

Tens of thousands of Arabs in northern Jordan held a pro-Iraqi, anti-American rally on August 12th. Most Jordanians, with 60 percent of their population Palestinian, tend to favor Saddam and oppose US intervention. And they don't hold much sympathy for Kuwait's deposed wealthy ruling family. Similar demonstrations were held by Palestinians in Lebanon and Israeli-occupied territories, as well as by militant Arabs in Yemen, Mauritania, Sudan, and Libya. Anti-government (pro-Iraq) rallies in Syria were also reported. This showing of Arab support for Saddam complicated the enforcement of sanctions.

In addition, the *Wall Street Journal* reported on August 16th that some 80,000 men, women, and children in Jordan signed up with the so-called Popular Front (organized by a Palestinian guerrilla without Jordanian government opposition) to serve as volunteers alongside Iraqi soldiers if they fight against the US. Saudi Arabia urged the Palestinians to support legitimacy because standing by Saddam in an invasion which resembles the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was hurting their cause.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration, with the initial contingent of US troops entrenched in the Saudi desert, began hinting at more belligerent plans. Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz reaffirmed on September 1st that US forces would only be allowed to attack Iraq from Saudi soil for the purpose of defending the kingdom. "The kingdom is not a theater for any action that is not defensive to Saudi Arabia," he said. "Saudi Arabia does not initiate hostilities against brother Arab states, Saudi Arabia is a defensive country.... It will do what is in the interest of the Arab world and what is in the interest of international peace and security." [San Jose Mercury News, 2 September 1990, p. 28A.] These reassuring public words did not agree with unofficial reports that in private discussions the

Saudis and most other Arabs were more pessimistic about avoiding offensive action.

### *1. Giving Teeth to the Sanctions.*

Bush ordered a naval interdiction campaign on August 12th and the unanimity so far experienced in the UN Security Council against Saddam wobbled. (US officials avoided the word "blockade" because under international law that is considered an act of war.)

On early August 17th the blockade went into effect in the northern end of the Persian Gulf, in the Gulf of Oman, and around Jordan's Red Sea port of Aqaba. The US Navy halted two Iraqi cargo ships but, upon determining they were empty, let them go without boarding. On the next day, US warships fired warning shots across the bows of two Iraqi outbound oil tankers, but they kept going. The tankers entered a port in Yemen but Yemen officials would not allow them to unload.

Bush claimed he had authority under the UN Charter to enforce the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Britain the next day said its ships would also intercept any vessels violating the sanctions. But the USSR, France, China and most of the other Security Council members maintained that any military action invoked in the name of the United Nations required another vote of the Council, implying that Bush's unilateral action was illegal. On August 16th, UN Secretary General Javier Perez Cuellar affirmed that any unilateral US action would violate the UN Charter.

France on August 19th said its warships would use force to uphold the UN embargo of Iraq. On the next day Colonel Muammer el-Qaddafi offered Libyan forces for the Persian Gulf if the UN authorized force to uphold a naval blockade, but he denounced the unauthorized US interdiction scheme. Canada, Australia, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Greece also agreed to send warships. West Germany offered minesweepers for the eastern Mediterranean -- as far as it could go without stepping out of NATO boundaries. In mid September, Argentina sent two warships.

Another Security Council resolution passed on August 18th demanded the release of foreign hostages. Saddam on September 1st started the release of hostage women and children, and some sick men. Many non-Westerner refugees were fleeing to camps in Jordan. France and Britain halted military aid to Jordan on September 5th because of its close ties to Iraq. This involved Mirage jet fighters from France and artillery shells from Britain.

On August 25th the UN Security Council by a vote of 13:0 (Cuba and Yemen abstaining) authorized the use of naval force to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq. The resolution called upon "those member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 633.] This was the first time in history that the Security Council had authorized military

force that was not under the UN's command and flag -- the Bush administration resisted putting US forces under UN control.

US warships were instructed to use minimal force, such as disabling a ship by shooting off its rudder, if that ship did not obey commands for inspection. Saddam ranted at the resolution and called the Security Council a puppet of the US. Amazingly, on August 27th, Baghdad instructed Iraqi vessels not to resist inspection efforts.

By August 30th the US Navy was intercepting about 75 ships a day, mostly by radio, in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman. By mid-September the number of boardings were about five a day. On September 4th an Iraqi ship loaded with tea from Sri Lanka was stopped and refused to return to its port of origin. The boarding party took command and sailed the freighter to Oman. Shots were again fired across the bow of an Iraqi tanker on September 14th, when it refused to stop. Upon determining that it was empty, the ship was allowed to proceed.

On September 13 the Security Council passed a resolution limiting the amount of food to Iraq during the embargo, and taking control over its delivery. The vote was 13:2 with Cuba and Yemen opposing.

In late September France, the US, and the USSR called for an extension of the embargo to include air routes. This led to a September 25th Security Council resolution extending the land and sea embargo to air traffic. It called on all UN member states to "deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait, other than food in humanitarian circumstances." [Facts on File, 1990, p. 717.] There were also provisions to prohibit unauthorized aircraft to overfly their territory bound for Iraq or Kuwait. Passenger flights by other than Iraq Airways are permitted if they don't carry proscribed cargo.

On October 29th the UN Security Council resolved that Iraq would be liable for damages, injuries and financial losses stemming from its invasion of Kuwait. Member nations were urged to start gathering data on Iraqi war crimes. The resolution also demanded immediate release of all hostages and instructed UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to undertake negotiations toward a peaceful solution to the standoff.

The Security Council's 12th resolution against Iraq was passed on 29 November 1990. It authorized member states to use military force against Iraq if Saddam has not pulled his troops out of Kuwait by 15 January 1990. The resolution was passed by a 12:2 vote with Yemen and Cuba against and China abstaining. Had China voted against, it would have vetoed the resolution.

## *2. The Israeli Connection.*

Israel had agreed to a US request that it keep a low profile in the crisis so as not to lend credibility to Saddam's claim that his enemies were Zionists. Such a belief, of course, was likely to unite all the Arabs behind Iraq's aggression. Nevertheless, Israel was concerned about standing idly by while the crisis made stronger ties between the US and moderate Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

On August 12th, Saddam for the first time linked the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait with "an immediate and unconditional Israeli pullout from the Arab-occupied territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon; the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon; and withdrawal between Iraq and Iran." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 598] Saddam also proposed that US forces in Saudi Arabia be replaced by an Arab force which would not include Egypt, "whose government was used by America as a crutch in its conspiracy against the Arab nation." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 598] It was suggested in official Western and Arab circles that Saddam was trying to improve his standing in the Arab world by linking his opponents to Israel, against which there is almost unanimous hatred. But on the other hand, many Arabs have rightfully raised the question of why the US reacted so decisively against the invasion of Kuwait while it remained unconcerned when Israel invaded Arab territories since 1967 and its invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

During the week leading up to August 15th, there was a war scare between Israel and Iraq. First Saddam claimed that disguised Israeli units had joined US forces in the Saudi desert, and threatened retaliation if Israel attacked Iraq. This prompted intense fears in Israel and the government prepared to distribute gas masks to civilians in case of an Iraqi chemical attack. Israel had enough gas masks for every citizen but feared that distributing them might be interpreted as preparing for an offensive. Citizens were advised, however, to stockpile food and buy masking tape to seal windows and doors against gas. Israel's counter threat was that any movement of Iraqi forces into Jordan, a buffer state between the two countries, would be considered a hostile act justifying a military response.

Mid-August news reports indicated that Israel was growing increasingly pessimistic over events in the Gulf, and suggested that the best action would be for the US to launch a massive air strike against military targets in Iraq. On October 7th the distribution of gas masks to the 4.6 million Israeli civilians and foreigners began. These sealed kits also included special masks for young children, tents for babies, and antidotes.

### **3. Contemplating Military Force.**

A few days after the CIA confirmed that Iraq had a sizable stockpile of biological weapons that could spread deadly typhoid, cholera, and anthrax diseases, House Armed Forces Committee Chairman Les Aspin on September 28th said Saddam would be able to deploy these weapons in early 1991. That fact, said Aspin, would have a bearing on how soon President Bush will resort to military force.

In late October, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud suggested that Saddam might retreat if Iraq is given a piece of Kuwait. Sultan said on October 21st that "Arab countries are ready to give Iraq all its rights," but added that any "Arab who has a claim on his brother should take it by understanding, not by force." Sultan added that his government "sees no harm in any Arab country giving its Arab sister land, a site or position on the sea.... We in Saudi Arabia have given parts of our land and parts of our territorial waters willingly.... But this came through good will, noble

manners and brotherhood." But the defense minister ruled out "any solution which does not provide for unconditional [Iraqi] withdrawal and reinstating" Kuwait's legitimate government. [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 789.]

Saddam had hinted in mid-October to Soviet envoy Yevgeny M. Primakov that he might withdraw in exchange for the Rumaila oil field and the islands of Bubiyan and Warba. But when this was printed by the Soviet news agency Novosti, Baghdad denied the statement and claimed that Kuwait will always be Iraqi territory. But even earlier than that, according to the August 29th issue of *Newsday* and verified by the White House, Iraq had offered a secret proposal to pull out of Kuwait if UN sanctions were lifted and the strip containing Rumaila, Bubiyan and Warba were ceded to Iraq. The Bush administration ignored this overture and Saddam appeared to publicly deny it in a later news interview.

Bush on October 23rd immediately rejected the idea of a negotiated settlement and stated that only unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territory was acceptable to him. During his last-minute election-campaign speeches Bush flip-flopped from his original announcements: "It isn't oil that we're concerned with, it's aggression, and this aggression is not going to stand." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 789.] Such was his departure from early August announcements which won him overwhelming bipartisan support -- announcements that he was only deploying troops in a purely defensive manner to protect US interests and prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia.

Congress in the meantime was demanding an greater role in making decisions on the Gulf situation, along with assurances from Bush that hostilities wouldn't start without Congressional consent. The administration continued to resist these demands.

Opposition was also mounting in the US public against operations in the Mid East. A mid-October poll by the *New York Times*/CBS showed that approval of Bush's handling of this crisis had dropped to 57 percent, from 75 percent right after the invasion. A *Washington Post*/ABC poll indicated comparable statistics, from 73 percent to 56 percent.

The war fever continued to mount. On October 25th, CIA Director Webster said the Mid East would never be secure as long as Iraq had weapons of mass destruction at its disposal. During speeches between October 28th and November 1st, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker mounted more hostile rhetoric suggesting the use of military force against Iraq. In San Francisco on October 29th Bush said he would use military force without Congressional authority, saying he'd done it in the past and would have no hesitation doing it again. In Los Angeles that same day Baker warned: "Let no one doubt: We will not rule out a possible use of force if Iraq continues to occupy Kuwait." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 806.]

Inoculation of US and British troops against Saddam's possible biological warfare bacteria began in December. Besides typhoid, cholera and anthrax, inoculations were also given to protect against botulism and tularemia.



### **C. OPERATION DESERT STORM**

The 29 November 1990 UN Security Council resolution authorizing member states to use military force to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait if he had not withdrawn by 15 January 1991 was hailed as a great victory for the United States and the Bush administration. In a show of generosity, and a willingness to "go the last mile," as he put it, Bush invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to meet with him in Washington, and suggested that US Secretary of State Baker meet with Saddam in Baghdad. In a November 30th television broadcast Bush said, "I would suggest to Iraq's president that he receive the Secretary of State at a mutually convenient time between December 15th and January 15th of next year." [Recorded in "To The Brink Of War."]

#### **1. *Inexorably Toward War.***

Although Bush quickly explained that these were not to be negotiating sessions and that there would be no concessions, Iraq accepted the offer. Bush set a December date to meet with Foreign Minister Aziz and Saddam picked January 12th to meet with Secretary Baker. In the meantime Saddam released the remainder of the hostages. Then Bush again flip-flopped from his November 30th statement and said Saddam's choice of time was too close to the 15th deadline. Both national leaders bickered like school kids, each stubbornly refusing to yield. A January 9th meeting in Geneva between Baker and Aziz failed to produce any break in the deadlock. The day after that ill-fated meeting in Geneva, Congress finally opened their long-avoided debate on whether it should approve war with Iraq. On January 12th, a scant three days before the deadline for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait, and apparently to save face because Bush would attack anyway, Congress consented to war.

#### **2. *An Opportunity Lost.***

By late 1990, the condition in the Persian Gulf offered possibly the greatest practical opportunity that has ever been made available to those who advocate non-military solutions to international conflict. Amid today's atmosphere of budding democracy in unlikely places, people of this world exhibit a mass inclination toward more peaceful solutions than our national leaders are pursuing.

The main disagreement was whether to wait and see if economic sanctions would work or whether to immediately employ military force. Advocates of military force claimed that even if sanctions did force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, his military machine would still be intact and a worse crisis would erupt later. Others pointed out that if Saddam is crushed militarily the Gulf-strongman vacuum would be filled by Iran. Neither of those were desirable eventualities.

Therefore, sanctions with a goal of merely forcing Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait would not provide long-term peace. But if the purpose of sanctions were to convince Saddam that the bargaining table is the best place to work out a just solution with fool-proof safeguards -- including troop withdrawal from both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait -- then the options were more optimistic. Those negotiations would have had to recognize legitimate complaints on both sides, to be

addressed within the cultural, social, and economic context of all participants. For that reason the negotiating teams would have required a substantial representation from the entire Arab world.

There also rose the accusation that sanctions were never effective in the past. But only twice before in its history had the Security Council imposed sanctions on a nation. The two previous occasions, against Rhodesia and South Africa, were voluntary with no means of enforcement. In the current instance the Security Council had authorized force -- the minimum possible, but whatever was needed -- to stiffen the embargo.

### 3. *Would Sanctions Have Worked?*

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney warned the Senate Armed Services Committee on 3 December 1990 that international economic sanctions were hurting the developing countries that traded with Iraq. But we have seen in foregoing sections of this paper how the international community responded to offset that financial repercussion, particularly in helping Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.

As early as mid-October, when UN sanctions against Iraq had been in place only two months, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn declared there was no doubt that they were working. White House correspondent for *Newsweek*, Ann McDaniel, reported that sanctions were working much better than the White House thought they would, that very little was getting into Iraq. But, she pointed out, Saddam was not responding as he was expected to respond. He apparently believed that he could sit out the sanctions, that he could split the coalition, and that the American people would not support any military conflict. ["To The Brink Of War"]

A November 1990 General Accounting Office report [GAO/NSIAD-91-76] explained that Iraq is heavily dependent on agricultural imports because of a high population growth rate and the scarcity of arable land. Iraq was importing 75 percent of its food by 1990 and America has been a major source of supply -- one-third of Iraq's agricultural imports comes from the US. Although the UN resolution on the embargo allows a reasonable amount of food and medicine, the Iraqi's will still have hardships and that doesn't make Saddam any more popular.

During the last week in November, several experts told the Senate Armed Services Committee that sanctions would work and that war is not the only option available. Those witnesses were later dubbed as "amateurs" and "uninformed" by Joint Staff Chairman, General Colin Powell. Hardly! They included two of Powell's predecessors -- retired Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. and retired Air Force General David C. Jones -- neither amateurs nor uninformed. Also included was James R. Schlesinger, former secretary of both defense and energy. Jones called the situation "potentially the most dangerous crisis yet" and cautioned that any solution would be temporary as long as basic problems in the area continued to fester. [*Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 3 December 1990, p. 25.] Crushing Saddam militarily does not address those basic problems of the wider region.

Crowe counseled patience, saying, "War is not neat, it is not tidy. It is a mess." [*Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 3 December 1990, p. 26.] Schlesinger thought there was a very high probability that sanctions would succeed, and that they were working already, and that they were the most effective sanctions ever invoked during peacetime. In only three months Iraq's production had dropped about 40 percent and oil exports were zero. Export earnings were down by a corresponding amount. Jones, Crowe and Schlesinger all agreed that Saddam's military capability would quickly erode without spare parts, and the Iraqis would soon have to start cannibalizing their equipment.

Admiral Crowe chided that it would be a sad situation "if Saddam Hussein, a two-bit tyrant who sits on 17 million people and possesses a gross national product of 40-billion dollars, proved to be more patient than the United States. [Cited in "To The Brink Of War."] As events turned out, he was -- and the situation is definitely sad.

#### 4. *Crossing The Line.*

Bush's line in the sand was crossed, but not by Iraq. In the early morning hours of 17 January 1991, local time, the war with Iraq began. Aircraft from the United States and its allies pounded military targets. Actual casualties are not known, partly because of heavy news censorship which has caused the media to severely criticize the Pentagon cover up of what has actually taken place. But the "collateral damage" -- tranquilizing Pentagon jargon for civilian casualties -- rise daily. Many military targets are also urban centers and bombing accuracy is seldom perfect. And the bombardment of Iraqi troops is bringing grief to many, many families as they learn of their son's or brother's death.

Neither is the war with Iraq going to be the quick decimation of Saddam's military power that so many have predicted. Lessons abound from World War II. Pacific islands were virtually blasted clean in softening-up bombardment, and still the resistance was unbelievable when landing barges hit the beach. I have seen dug-in emplacements shelled high explosives and bombed with napalm until it seemed that no living being could possibly survive, and then have fierce resistance when ground troops tried to occupy the area. The same will happen in Iraq and Kuwait. Iraqis are having the high death toll now, but the mortality tally sheets will be equalized when the ground war begins.

Senator George Mitchell voiced an appropriate epitome: "And the truly haunting question which no one will ever be able to answer will be 'Did they die unnecessarily?' For if we go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have worked if given a full and fair chance." [Cited in "To The Brink Of War."]

## VII -- SUMMARY: LUST FOR WAR

I have always believed that when the task of establishing a more peaceful world starts to become effective, there will be a tremendous backlash to maintain the status quo. Those who are gaining from a turbulent global political atmosphere are not about to simply lie down and give up their source of riches. Recently we have rejoiced in democracy flowering in Europe and an end to the cold war. What we are seeing today in the Persian Gulf is the backlash to those gains.

### **A. HIGH POINTS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

The decade of the 1980s saw many breakthroughs in popular struggles for self-determination, particularly through nonviolent means. Zimbabwe's rise from the dust of Rhodesian apartheid hailed the beginning of the 1980s. Although Zimbabwe was the child of violent revolution, it did grant safe residence and equality to former white supremacists who were willing to recognize majority rule. The final result was moderately peaceful.

People Power unseated Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos during early 1986. This amazing unification of many factions in Filipino politics put President Corazon Aquino in Malacanang Palace. She then traveled a bumpy road as those various factions again began grinding their individual axes. Nevertheless, the People-Power Revolution of February 1986 was a case study in nonviolent political processes.

Another small Pacific nation -- Palau, in Micronesia -- must not be overlooked in its persistence over decades to maintain indigenous self-determination. Pitted against the mighty United States, a mere 15,000 people have nonviolently resisted the presence of nuclear weapons and military use of their land. What they sometimes faced was far from nonviolent, but persistence and faith has so far succeeded. Palau's example has inspired the independence movement of other Pacific countries.

China made its try for democracy in early 1989 but was quickly squelched by bloody force. With no outside strings to mitigate government reaction, the military acted with impunity, executing the deadly massacre in Tiananmen Square. But the spirit could not be so easily crushed and still flourishes underground.

Solidarity in Poland had tremendous successes in the early 1980s. Everything came together for a jump to a higher plateau of consciousness. There existed a condition where businessmen sympathetic to the government's position had to conceal their feelings in order to prosper. Martial law then cracked down and forced Solidarity underground, but not forever. In the waning years of the 1980s Solidarity again surfaced to gain control of government.

Solidarity's example spread like wildfire. Other Eastern-bloc countries espoused democracy. Most of these turnovers were

nonviolent but in a few instances, such as in Romania, the military usurped nonviolent processes to further their own objectives, with dubious success. Then came the uprising of the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia demanded freedom. More Soviet republics then revolted and those who did so violently were the first to be repressed. Later, under cover of the Persian Gulf crisis, the Kremlin brought its iron fist down on the Baltics in a crackdown reminiscent of what occurred in Poland eight years earlier -- a crackdown which will certainly be just as fruitless in the long run.

All of this activity combined with Moscow's new policies of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (reordering) have undermined the prospects of large American trans-national corporations. First of all, these new Soviet policies are aimed at putting the USSR in a better position to compete economically on the global scene. That means stiffer competition for First World business entrepreneurs. Secondly, the new Moscow policies dilute the enemy image which has fueled the profitable arms race -- and the cold war aimed at bankrupting Moscow, thereby abating economic competition.

A new "world order" based on the force of justice, not the law of force, was emerging. Insofar as changes came about by peaceful means, they enhanced this new world order, thus making the entire world more secure.

A euphoria over the fall of communism was rising in America. Taxpayers correctly reasoned that continuing the military buildup was unnecessary. They demanded a peace dividend to alleviate pressing social problems. Pentagon brass had to argue vociferously and convincingly to protect their pet projects. Star Wars came under fire, as did the B-2 bomber, several missile systems, various aircraft and ships, and the need for so many military bases at home and abroad. By late 1989 the international and domestic situations were ripe for vested-interest factions to lash out, and they did. A promising tyrant in the Mid East was seduced into aggressive moves.

## **B. BAITING SADDAM AND DECEIVING AMERICA**

Friction in the Persian Gulf made that region a likely prospect in which to unleash the backlash. OPEC members were doing their usual squabbling over prices and quotas. Badly in need of revenues after its war with Iran, Iraq was losing money from the low crude prices and excess petroleum on the world market. Saddam Hussein threatened the two most blatant production-quota violators -- Kuwait and the UAE, countries which top the list in Arab wealth.

The Bush administration, as did the Reagan administration before it, had been courting Saddam as a ready market for US agricultural and manufactured products. They had also been tacitly helping Iraq in its war with Iran. When Saddam took a hostile attitude toward the wealthy Kuwaiti ruling family, Bush saw an opportunity to lead him on. The mixed signals sent before the invasion of Kuwait were certainly calculated to encourage Saddam's aggressive tendencies. When he finally did strike out, Desert Shield and then Desert Storm came into

play. Let us examine more closely the proffered justifications for US involvement in the Persian Gulf region.

*1. To protect the Saudi Oil Fields.*

US Troops were immediately deployed to Saudi Arabia for the announced purpose of preventing Iraq's invasion of that country and to protect Saudi oil fields. Had Saddam wanted to, he could have invaded Saudi Arabia before US troops arrived. Possibly the recently-signed non-aggression pact with the Saudis prevented him from doing so, but in light of Saddam's past behavior that seems unlikely. Perhaps he again misjudged US reactions and thought he had plenty of time to invade and move south toward the UAE. Whatever the reason, he tarried in Kuwait.

What would have happened if Saddam had invaded Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the remedy to that aggression was left to an Arab solution. Although he would have gained control of almost half the world's known oil reserves, the pan-Arab philosophy on distribution of wealth would have been against him. Conditions for the Arab people would likely not have been any worse than under the monopoly of wealth practiced by ruling families. Although corrupt, the Iraqi government is also paternalistic in providing for its people.

Even from a strictly selfish US point of view, the oil supply would not have been greatly altered. Most oil imported by the US comes from Mexico. Interrupting the Saudi oil flow would certainly raise world oil prices, but it would have been to Saddam's advantage to continue production. With his hands on a larger and easily-produced supply, he would be swayed toward a high production rate with low prices. That being so, the US supply of oil would continue to be as cheap as ever. Furthermore, a responsible US energy policy would lower reliance on oil and thus reduce the world demand, which would in turn reduce oil prices.

What would have really happened if Saddam had invaded Saudi Arabia is that the Aramco partners would have been evicted. Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, and Mobil would no longer have had their hands on the ludicrous profits from managing Saudi petroleum production. It seems obvious that the wealthy faction of our society -- the military-industrial complex, including big oil -- is George Bush's real constituency. They are the ones he listens to, not John and Jane Public. That is why he is willing to slaughter tens of thousands of American and Iraqi youth who are drawn from poor and middle-class families. That is why he tenaciously argues for a cut in capital-gains taxes. So let it be clear, the first introduction of US troops was to protect the business interests of Big Oil. But it was only a foot in the door for what was to come.

We should recognize what is meant by the phrase "national interests." When various administrations over the past decades have justified large military budgets as necessary to protect our "national interests," those interests have too often been corporate profits. Critical to understanding military hegemony is for us to analyze exactly what our collective and national interests should be. Is our wealth worth the blood of our youth? What does the fear of losing

our comfort do to our attitude toward others? The questions go on and on but they need to be asked, and answered.

## **2. To Stop Naked Aggression.**

As soon as that foot was in the door, the administration's motives became more belligerent and other goals were introduced. One set of goals can be summed up as stopping naked aggression, forcing Saddam's withdrawal from Kuwait, and restoring Kuwait's legitimate government. Then there comes the question of why the US reacted so strongly to the invasion of Kuwait when other similar incidents went without comment.

The first parallel was Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank have been occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War. There was no strong reaction from the US when that took place and Israel has continued to be armed by the US ever since.

The Republic of Cyprus, formerly a British colony, was inaugurated on 16 August 1960. But friction between the Turks in the north and Greeks in the south had caused declining relations between Greece and Turkey since the early 1950s. A coup instigated by the military dictatorship of Greece ousted the Cyprus government on 15 July 1974. Five days later Turkish forces invaded the islands. Hostilities continued until August 16th, by which time the island country was partitioned into the Turkish northern sector and the Greek area to the south. On 15 November 1983 the northern sector declared itself the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey immediately recognized the new nation but reaction from other countries was negative. Attempts at reunification begun in 1988 have so far proved unproductive. Turkey has stationed between 25,000 and 30,000 troops in Cyprus since 1974. No action by the US, UN, or NATO has been taken to end that occupation.

In March 1975 the people of East Timor, controlled by Portugal since 1586, were preparing for an election to determine their future political status. Choices on the ballot were (a) a continued link with Portugal, (b) integration with the Indonesian part of the island, or (c) independence. Shortly after that fighting broke out between rival groups and by August of that year Portugal admitted it had lost control of the situation. In early December 1975, claiming it was acting at the request of groups favoring integration with Indonesia, Indonesia invaded the territory, captured the capital, and set up a provisional government. Timorese guerrillas have fought for freedom ever since. Guerrilla leader Shanana Gusmao speaks of Kuwait as a carbon copy of what happened in East Timor:

This is why we are puzzled by the statement of UN deputy secretary general, Refeeuddin Ahmed, who introduced geographic interpretations [suggesting the Asian context was different] in discussing self-determination.... Iraq asserts that Kuwait was always a part of Iraq but was separated by colonialism. In response, the UN has stood up in defense of its universal principles and created a "desert shield" because the Middle East is not Asia.

According to this geographical interpretation, we can now expect Pakistan to reserve the right to challenge the colonial borders of Kashmir and the UN will not be able to create an "Asian shield." Under the protection of such an interpretation, Indonesia will hardly be able to wait to grab Papua New Guinea. That, of all places, is a real farce because it was colonialism which drew the border down the middle of the huge Papuan island. Elsewhere in Asia, nobody will be able to comment about the complaints of the Tibetans, because the Asian context [according to geographical interpretation] rejects the right of self-determination and confers the right of reclaiming territories to big states which have power ... and oil. Iraq is in Kuwait because of oil and Indonesia is in East Timor because of oil. [Cited in "East Timor: Kuwait is a Carbon Copy of What Happened."]

If the justification for the use of military force in the Persian Gulf is to stop naked aggression, why do Israel, Turkey, and Indonesia still occupy territories taken by such naked aggression?

### *3. To Protect the New World Order.*

Budding democracy, the nonviolent overthrow of dictatorships, and the end of the cold war highlighted the 1980s. To the common citizen on both sides of the iron curtain this new "world order" was a welcome event, and thus the term has been systematically exploited for vested-interest purposes. That is because the consequences of this new world order are more ambiguous for the military-industrial complex. On the one hand, it provides a market for American goods in former communist countries -- the real reason behind that hasty reunification of Germany.

But on the other hand, increased economic competition from the Soviet Union, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, is not a welcome prospect for Western transnational corporations. Neither is the public demand to reduce military spending -- support for the corporate bodyguard -- welcomed by big businesses. It was to guard against a peace dividend that military operations in the Persian Gulf were deemed necessary. Therefore it is a contradiction of terms to suggest that we are fighting to preserve a new world order. It is precisely to protect the old status quo for the Pentagon, the weapons merchants, and Third-World entrepreneurs that massive military action was required.

The protect-a-new-world-order justification falls flat in another aspect. Wreaking carnage is exactly what was avoided in the nonviolent upset of dictators that brought about a new world order. Throwing history back to military solutions for the world we want to live in strikes against the basic values desired in that world. That is the main reason this world has not yet achieved an order based on peace and justice. Mahatma Gandhi cautioned that one cannot achieve a peaceful end by violent means -- that means are only ends in the making. Negotiations and embargoes admittedly take longer and require greater patience, but they are a better means toward a new world order.



#### **4. To Maintain Stability in the Persian Gulf Region.**

Stability in the Persian Gulf and protection for the lives of American citizens abroad (a chauvinistic reason) have also been proffered as justification for military force. This reverts to the Vietnam-War policy of destroying a village to save it. Aggression by what the Arab and Muslim worlds view as an imperialistic power does nothing but deepen the hate of all concerned.

Any credible plan for stability in the Mid East must encompass a comprehensive agreement involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Such an agreement would involve all Arab nations, the PLO, Iran, and possibly Turkey. Consideration should be given to the peace plans already proposed by Arab leaders

At least two of the Security Council's permanent members have already called for such a plan. During the September 1990 summit meeting in Helsinki, Soviet President Gorbachev suggested convening a Mid East peace conference. Moscow, usually pro-Arab, said it was open to restoring diplomatic relations with Israel (broken since the 1967 war) if Israel would support a Mid-East peace conference. The other permanent member was France. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 4 September 1990 President Francois Mitterand proposed a four-stage Mid East peace plan. That plan, still valid, is as follows:

- a) Saddam declare that he will remove all his forces from Kuwait.
- b) The international coalition promise to withdraw forces from the Persian Gulf and insure free and democratic elections in Kuwait.
- c) Following steps (a) and (b), but before any forces are actually withdrawn, negotiations would begin to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Lebanese civil war.
- d) The final step is mutually-agreed arms reduction all the way from Morocco to Iran.

Saddam has already said that such a conference would be the only acceptable avenue toward resolving the Gulf crisis. He would certainly agree to a cease fire if the US and Israel supported the above proposal. The cease-fire proposal agreed upon between the US Secretary of State Baker and the new Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh on 29 January 1991 sounds similar to Mitterand's. The sticky point of disagreement seems to be whether Saddam must withdraw his troops before or after the conference begins. Resolving that sticky point lies with us Americans.

Addressing the UN General Assembly on 1 October 1990, President Bush again demanded Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, but also hinted at opportunities later regarding Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On 20 December 1990 the US signed a UN resolution which defined the West Bank as Palestinian territory and gave qualified support to a Mid East peace plan. The Bush administration's policy is not against a Mid-East peace plan -- it is against such a plan before the US has won a political/military victory, and Saddam has lost face.

Israel has gone on record that it will not give up anything in whatever settlement comes from the Gulf crisis. Perhaps Bush's reluctance to be too supportive of a comprehensive Mid-East peace plan is the ransom that keeps Israel out of the war. It may be time for Israel to give in on some issues instead of riding US coattails to get what it wants. Neither is it in Bush's province to guarantee Israel that it will not have to give up anything, which he has done.

From the other viewpoint, the Arab nations should recognize Israel and Kuwait as sovereign states. And of course further consideration for Kurdish autonomy is in order.

**5. *To Curb the Proliferation of Mass-Destruction Weapons.***

This was poised as a justification prior to the US use of military force. Now Iraq's means of producing weapons of mass destruction have been largely or completely destroyed. Even if this were ever a valid justification for initiating hostilities, it is no longer a reason for continued aggression.

In fact, this proffered justification for starting the war is now more than ever a reason why a comprehensive Mid-East peace conference should be held. Curbing the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons is a mandatory agenda item. Such a curb on proliferation can only be effective when all nations are considered. So long as the Gulf war continues the proliferation will continue.

**6. *To Keep Saddam from Cornering the World Energy Market.***

This proffered justification would have been dealt with immediately in a comprehensive Mid East peace plan. One of the goals of pan-Arabism is to have an equitable distribution of wealth. This topic will be addressed in more detail below.

**C. BUSH STACKS HIS DECK**

Prior to passage of the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq, President Bush made a capital-hopping trip around the globe. We'll probably never know how many deals he made to garner support behind US determination to smash Saddam, but some have come to light.

William Safire [see bibliography] reported that partial payment for US use of Turkish air bases, from which to strike Iraq from the north, was not to encourage the nationalist movement in Kurdish populations. One-sixth of Turkey's people are Kurds and any autonomous gains in neighboring Iraq would have upsetting repercussions in Turkey as well as Syria, Iran and the USSR.

Rather than vetoing the resolution authorizing military force, China abstained. After the Tiananmen Square massacre, China is having trouble living down its poor human-rights image. Abstaining from the vote must have been in return for relieving US sanctions against China. Also, immediately following passage of the resolution, and while other major powers were occupied with the Gulf war, China commenced the trials of its political dissidents.

It was also while other powers were deeply immersed in Persian Gulf activities that Moscow applied military violence to crush

dissidence in its Baltic republics. Some observers suggest a Bush/Gorbachev deal that the US would soft-pedal the Baltic crackdown if the Soviets backed the Gulf war. That deal didn't muzzle the press, however, and in late January 1991 Gorbachev pledged to withdraw some troops from the Baltics. But he didn't say how many or how soon.

Apparently Yemen did not heed Bush's call for unity behind the US-sponsored resolution. That country had been receiving some \$22 million in aid annually from the US. Immediately after Yemen cast a "no" vote on the UN resolution, that aid was cut to \$2.5 million per year.

#### **D. COVERT REASONS FOR THE WAR**

Several less-publicized motivating factors for the Gulf war stand out when events since 2 August 1990 are analyzed. They cannot be advertised as a reason for the war but they are touted as the result of far-sighted policies to make America strong. In reality, the product of these policies -- weapons and strategies -- were more likely self-fulfilling prophesies which caused America to initiate and escalate its own aggression. Some of these covert reasons for US intervention are given below.

##### **1. *Testing Rapid-Deployment Strategy.***

Since quick-strike force mobility was designed by General Maxwell Taylor and practiced on a small scale in Vietnam, the Pentagon has been yearning to exercise a quick transfer of military forces and equipment on a global scale. Light infantry divisions have been formed and trained for rapid relocation and large cargo planes have been built to carry troops and equipment. Agreements with commercial airlines also come into play to augment the air-transportation fleet. As rapid deployment forces were organized and trained, they were put under a new US Central Command (CENTCOM) with headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Preliminary exercises took place in Grenada and Panama.

After Saddam was tacitly encouraged to invade Kuwait, the opportunity came to put CENTCOM into action. As Desert Shield emerged, CENTCOM headquarters was quickly redeployed to Saudi Arabia. Thus began the largest overseas deployment since the Vietnam War.

##### **2. *Testing Overwhelming and Decisive Force Policy.***

Pentagon analysts now blame their failure in Vietnam on gradual escalation of US involvement. Such gradualism is now anathema among military planners. During the Carter administration, and before Presidential Directive 59 was signed, a study focused on a strategy to eliminate the opponent as a functioning national entity by destroying targets that would paralyze, disrupt and dismember the opponent's government. This approach is now integrated in the Pentagon's discriminate deterrence strategy -- a melding together all operations from covert CIA low-intensity warfare to global thermonuclear war, all varying steps of escalation. During Bush's trial run in Panama, decapitation of the leader failed miserably and military performance was dubious at best.

When the Persian Gulf pot started bubbling, discriminate deterrence was given the acid test. Actual use of military force was delayed due to United Nations resistance and Congressional questioning. But when it did come it was overwhelming, though far from decisive. Had Pentagon planners had full sway, and not had to worry about sending body bags home, the effect may have been more decisive.

### 3. *Providing a Proving Ground for New Military Technology.*

Pentagon warehouses are full of high technology weapons systems just waiting to prove their worth. Desert Storm provided that opportunity. New smart bombs, advanced aircraft, and cruise missiles were unleashed in one mighty blow after another. The new Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint-STARS) aircraft made its debut and the Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) plane received its baptism to fire. Phase-2 improvements of the Patriot surface-to-air missile apparently proved its worth. These more sensational weapons and systems only sample the spectrum of aircraft, missiles, sensors and radars, satellites, ships, launchers, fighting vehicles, etc., etc., which have been or are still waiting to be demonstrated. The laboratory is full of test specimens, and the proving ground is busy.

In addition, expending these high-technology weapons and the cost of operations has assured the Pentagon an ample budget for years to come, while the weapons merchants' production lines continue to roll.

At the time of this writing the ground war has not started. But we can rest assured it is on Bush's agenda. There are still many systems -- new tanks, anti-tank weapons, armored personnel carriers, and more -- which have not yet been tried in combat.

### 4. *Appeasing Israel.*

Before the US initiated military force in mid-January 1991, Israel had issued an ultimatum that if the US doesn't crush Iraq, Israel will. Keeping Israel out of the war could well have been another reason the US attacked Iraq. Had Israel initiated the attack, the coalition of nations allied against Iraq would have been immediately destroyed. Arab countries would have aligned themselves with Saddam. Non-Arab Muslim nations, such as Iran, would also have sided with Iraq. It is a sad situation when the US is held hostage by a nation it has armed. Perhaps the bloody war is the price we must now pay for keeping Israel the most powerful country in the Mid East.

## VIII -- CONCLUSION: YEARNING FOR PEACE

The thinking of so-called pro-troops and anti-war people are not as far apart as some would have us believe. Support for the troops is not the same as support for the war. The natural tendency to get behind one's country in times of crisis does not mean we approve of the killing. Parents who fly the American Flag do not want their children brought home in a body bag. They are just as much against bloodshed as the war protesters. And most American parents can empathize with their Iraqi counterparts who grieve over youngsters killed by US bombs. All of us on both sides of that line in the sand yearn for peace. Better knowledge of the situation and a chance to bridge the culture gap gives us a chance to sort out our feelings. I hope this paper helps that process.

### **A. BRIDGING THE CULTURE GAP**

A striking example in culture gap occurred during the pre-war standoff when Bush demanded that Saddam withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. With no means to save face the withdrawal would have meant Saddam's shame and demise in Baghdad. Total lack of culture understanding was exemplified when Bush said he had a gut feeling that Saddam would pull out. This failure to reach an amicable solution reminds me of an anecdote.

A negotiator from a Western nation, feeling that at last the difficult talks he was conducting with a representative from an Eastern nation were beginning to show some progress, sought to encourage his counterpart. "We're beginning to think along parallel lines," he summed up, smiling. The Easterner smiled back and silently concluded that the negotiations had failed utterly and must be carried on smoothly in order to preserve the mutual honor of parties. For "parallel lines," the Eastern negotiator understood with perfect common sense, never meet. ["Toward Greater Cultural Awareness:", p. 1]

To help our minds meet we should recognize how we might misunderstand another cultures. Things that we take for granted in one context can have a completely different meaning to another. When Paul R. Kimmel, a social psychologist specializing in communications, was a research fellow at the US Institute of Peace he observed that international negotiations are shifting from adversarial standpoints to infrastructures which promote trust, accommodation, and mutual recognition of nonnegotiable issues. That was certainly not the case during pre-hostilities in the Persian Gulf.

Even so, Kimmel says cultural factors are still too often dismissed as secondary to Western negotiating techniques which are

dominated by scientific precepts, technology, protocol, and international law. He describes the attitudes in several levels of cultural awareness -- starting with the least aware and moving toward fuller awareness. As we reviewed these attitudes, compare them to American behavior prior to Operation Desert Storm.

Chauvinism -- the cultures of other people are never considered.

Ethnocentrism -- other cultures are acknowledged but chalked up as inferior.

Tolerance -- other cultures' values and customs are considered valid in their own traditional setting, but have no place in international relations.

Mutual Cultural Understanding -- brought about by intercultural exploration, where negotiators can rise above their differences in behavior, thought, and communication styles.

Another US Institute of Peace fellow, Raymond Cohen, a senior lecturer in political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, provides additional tips. He argues that certain cultural factors such as concepts of time, styles of argument, and considerations of status or prestige all play a part in reaching successful agreements. To better understand the part these aspects play, Cohen introduces the concept of "high-context" and "low-context" cultures.

We Americans live in a low-context culture. We try to get to the point quickly and be as specific as possible. Time is valuable and not to be wasted. We prefer informality over elaborate style and eloquent words, equality over hierarchy, rights and duties over ascribed loyalty.

High-context cultures look upon life differently. The manner of speech and behavior are important in protecting group harmony and avoiding insults. A rebuff is an occasion of shame. Conversation is often elusive and circumspect as the speaker tests the waters for acceptance of what is being said. Argument and contradiction are abhorred.

This discussion of cultural differences are far from exhaustive and merely illustrate the point that one must proceed with extreme caution and compassion in order to settle differences. Many differences between Western and Arab nations could be and still can be avoided by recognizing the conflicting value structures between low-context and high-context cultures.

## **B. PROGNOSIS IF WAR CONTINUES**

At the time of this writing the ground war has not started. If it does, casualties will surge. CENTCOM commander, General Schwarzkopf, admits that the intensified bombing of Iraq and Kuwait is only the beginning of a "very, very major campaign." Schwarzkopf admits that it's an intensely emotionally thing with him. He says, "I

get enough sleep, but I don't get enough rest because I wake up 15, 20, 25 times in the middle of the night, and my brain is just in turmoil over some of these agonizingly difficult decisions that I have to make.... Every waking and sleeping moment my nightmare is the fact that I will give an order that will cause countless numbers of human beings to lose their lives. I don't want my troops to die. I don't want my troops to be maimed." [Cited in San Jose, CA *Mercury News*, 5 February 1991, p. 11A.] If the commanding general is that worked up about the coming carnage, how about the psychological well-being of those who will be sacrificed? Let us look at where the war can go.

### *1. Vertical Escalation of the Conflict.*

Initiating the ground war will be a massive escalation in both physical and psychological casualties -- not only in cumulative numbers but in the rate of occurrence. The battlefield as far worse than anything experienced in World War II, or since.

Facing conventional high-technology weapons is bad enough. But it is almost certain that Saddam has given his front-line commanders permission to use chemical weapons at their discretion. When they face certain defeat, those commanders will assuredly employ poisonous gases as they have in the past. Then, possibly, the United States would also violate international law and respond in kind. It may be a temptation to test the new binary type of nerve gas. But on the other hand, the fear of world condemnation may be a retardant.

I believe it is more likely that a US response to a gas attack would be with the ultimate weapon. No battlefield nuclear weapon has been tested in combat -- air-launched and sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, 155-mm and 8-inch artillery-fired atomic projectiles, nuclear-tipped Lance missiles, and neutron warheads for both Lance and the 8-inch artillery. I feel that the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis will unleash barrages of nuclear detonations. One of the eventualities we are trying to prevent with a cease fire is no more and no less than tactical nuclear war. Where it would go from there would depend on the reaction of other nuclear powers.

Biological or bacteriological weapons are one horror device. They would not be confined to the battlefield but could be smuggled almost anywhere in the world. They might strike in a foxhole, or a kindergarten room. They could kill or incapacitate multitudes with epidemics beyond which our medical capacity could cope. The potential for destruction could be many fold that of chemical or nuclear weapons. Is this in Saddam's plan? There is no doubt that he would use them if he could.

### *2. Horizontal Escalation of the War.*

Besides escalating to weapons of mass destruction, the Persian Gulf War has the potential for becoming World War III. The longer it goes on, the bigger the hero Saddam appears. By standing up to and prevailing against the world's strongest superpower Saddam is growing as an ethnic hero in Arab eyes. Also increasing is ethnic and religious resentment than an Arab and Muslim nation is being pounded by an infidel, imperialistic power. Anti-US sentiments are growing in the Mid East -- even beyond the Arab world. Muslim countries like

Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are also simmering with rage to see the Islamic treasures of Baghdad being decimated. Iran could enter the war on the side of Iraq at any time. Although Iranians don't like Iraqis, they hate the US even more. Possibly the only thing that has kept Iran out of the war so far is that the offensive against Iraq is ostensibly a United Nations venture, not just the US. But the longer the war continues, the nearer Saddam will be to his goal of breaking the international coalition allied against him -- particularly the Arab faction.

Should the Israelis at some point decide to retaliate against Iraq's Scud missile attacks, it is certain that Syria and Jordan would side with Iraq -- Iran too, if it hadn't already, and possibly other Arab and Muslim countries. That retaliation may not be far off. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has stated that a chemical attack would exhaust Israel's patience. Saddam would then have succeeded in taunting Israel into the war to break the allied coalition and incite a holy war. Jordan has already advised all Americans to leave the country because of tensions building there. US embassies in other Arab and Muslim countries have become more watchful. Even moderate Egypt, a champion for peace in the Mid East, has anti-US resentment rising in the ranks of its populace.

One need only look at the map to see the geographic extent that World War III could encompass. And however or whenever the war ends, the hate already smoldering in the Mid East will affect international relations for years to come. Yet that hate has not reached maximum intensity. It would be advantageous to effect an immediate cease fire and start comprehensive negotiations to address the multitude of Mid-East grievances. What the US and its allies have done so far is vastly counter productive but conditions will only get worse if military action continues.

#### C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR A CEASE FIRE

I have discussed above (see VII-B-4) how Saddam has insisted that withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait be linked with an Israeli pullout from Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon. Bush, on the other hand, has said there will be no cease fire as long as Saddam is in Kuwait. So the main obstacle to a cease fire and a subsequent Mid-East peace conference seems to be whether Saddam must make an unequivocal commitment to pull out of Kuwait or actually pull out before peace talks begin. As serious as the situation is, it would not hurt the US to give a little on this issue. Agreeing to that, tremendous citizen pressure must be applied to convince the Bush administration. The various groups and organizations in the American peace and justice movement would have to put their separate goals on the back burner temporarily and unite behind the common goal of influencing a cease fire, resumption of sanctions, and convening of a comprehensive Mid-East peace conference. Likewise for all churches, professional organizations, college groups, unions, community organizations, etc., must do the same. When a strong and united alliance confronts our elected politicians, including the President, those officials must act if they



want to stay in office. In short, we Americans must take our Constitution seriously and make democracy work.

The sooner a cease fire can be put in effect, the more bloodshed can be avoided. Then the military forces standing by in the Gulf should be put under a UN command.

#### D. INSTITUTE A UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

To alleviate the tensions and distrust building up in the Mid East, the armed forces in the Gulf region should be put under United Nations command and the UN flag after a cease fire is accepted by both sides. That action will demonstrate global unity and dilute the Arab perception of an imperialist country imposing its military presence.

A UN command would also garner more cooperation from other countries, even Arab countries. This will dilute Saddam's image as the Arab champion of the Gulf. Under a UN flag, Qatar has already offered multi-nation forces the use of its facilities. Moscow has also offered troops and equipment for a UN command.

Less than a fortnight after the invasion of Kuwait, on August 14th, Washington suggested that the UN Security Council reactivate its Military Staff Committee. Moscow had been pressing for this and the US agreed as a conciliatory gesture. This committee consists of representatives from the military chiefs of the five permanent members of the Council, but it has previously been unable to function because of the cold war. The purpose of the Military Staff Committee is to oversee enforcement of Council resolutions. On 29 October 1990 the Military Staff Committee met to discuss enforcement of the resolutions against Iraq. It had never before convened with such high ranking representation.

Possibly the best argument for a UN command is political rather than operational. A UN command would enhance the image of the United Nations as a viable instrument for settling international disputes. Of more immediate importance, the Arab world would feel more comfortable in negotiating under the auspices of a unified global body.

America has for years not cooperated with the United Nations -- has defied or ignored its rulings, avoided participation in special sessions on disarmament, shown contempt for the World Court, and fallen behind in financial support. That practice must stop and the current crisis is an opportune chance for Americans to see that it does. By giving credibility and respect to the authority of the United Nations and its agencies, the new world order becomes more a reality.

#### E. PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE MID EAST

Let us return to the comprehensive Mid-East peace negotiations which are undoubtedly the only medium for a peaceful, lasting end to the war. If it weren't for the US and Israel, those negotiations would probably be in progress now. The USSR and France -- even Saddam, himself -- has advocated such negotiations since shortly after the takeover of Kuwait. They could begin as soon as a cease

fire is effected. What follows is a composite of ideas set forth by several intelligent and concerned people. Arab input and representation should predominate on issues affecting their potential pan-Arab state.

**1. Address Legitimate Iraqi Grievances.**

The border between Kuwait and Iraq has been a bone of contention since World War I. Except for a few who have personally benefitted, the Arab world has never recognized the partitioning of Mesopotamia and northern Africa. When Britain and the Sabah family carved out the country of Kuwait, they acquired a beautiful harbor with ready access to the Persian Gulf and its trade routes so important to development. Iraq was left with two inadequate ports.

Some analysts believe that Saddam on 30 September 1990 was indicating that if Kuwait ceding the small sliver that was shaved off and named in his honor, it would satisfy Iraqi demands. In that speech Saddam departed from his previous theme of Kuwait being annexed as a province of Iraq and declared that "among the things that concern us most is that things not go back to the situation before August 2." [Cited in *Facts on File*, 1990, p. 737.] US Secretary of State Baker acknowledged that Saddam had hinted at withdrawal if he could have the Rumaila oil fields and the islands of Bubiyan and Warba.

When looking at the situation with unprejudiced eyes, and no matter how much Saddam has bungled the issue by bullying his way around, Iraq should have better access to the Persian Gulf. Whatever the solution, it should be reached by Arab negotiators.

**2. Address Arab Wealth Distribution.**

All Arab states aspire to the concept of Arab unity. One consideration of pan-Arabism is equitable distribution of wealth and resources. That is not the case at present and some rich rulers, with US help, are striving to preserve the status quo. Khalil Sabra points out the disparities in the per capita income of various Arab countries:

UAE	\$69,000
Kuwait	\$24,000
Saudi Arabia	\$11,500
Iraq	\$ 2,400
Syria	\$ 700
Egypt	\$ 560
Sudan	\$ 300

[Source: Sabra, p. 5C]

Kuwait has for a long time channeled much wealth to a minority of the people in a small population. Neighboring countries, Iraq in particular, want Kuwait's resources spread over a larger population. It is an issue that should be addressed and addressing it will have repercussions in Saudi Arabia (ruled by the Saud family), the UAE, and others.

### **3. Stop Weapons Profiteering.**

The present crisis, like uncountable crises of the past, was made possible by unscrupulous weapons makers who sell to anyone for a profit. Hard and fast rules against weapons trafficking are needed. It should be made an explicit international crime to sell weapons to other countries. Possibly as a start in the peace agreement under consideration, it should be considered illegal to sell any more weapons to a Mid East country. That is far from adequate from a global viewpoint, but it is a start.

### **4. Remove the Nuclear Threat.**

Possibly Israel appeared justified in developing an atom bomb since Saddam has repeatedly threatened to annihilate his "Zionist enemy." These threats were taken seriously by Israel. Now however, CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, says that Iraq's nuclear-weapons-development capability has been completely destroyed. The threat against Israel no longer exists. Through some agreement, Iraq must be prevented from again pursuing a nuclear capability. That means other Mid-East nations must also reduce their war-making potential and be more open about their nuclear aspirations. Nuclear superpowers will be called upon to set an example. The atmosphere is right for some meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons.

### **5. Address Kurdish Autonomy,**

A Mid-East peace plan would not be comprehensive without some consideration of the Kurdish situation. It would be ideal, from the Kurdish viewpoint and probably in the interest of justice, to establish the geographic nation of Kurdistan. That, however, would also affect Syria along with the non-Arab countries of Turkey, Iran, and the Soviet Union. Such an agreement may be impossible.

Nevertheless, the Kurdish cultural struggle for a homeland is just as urgent and just as critical to stability in the Mid East as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. It should be included on the agenda of a Mid East peace conference. Even if it is not possible to establish the full nationalism of Kurdistan, Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is possible, no matter what precedent it sets in neighboring states.

### **F. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE**

Good things do not come easily. The Persian Gulf turmoil is a sign of opportunities waiting if we proceed properly. Opportunities in the past have been limited and then preempted by military intervention. Now, however, there is widespread insistence on a peaceful ending. Acting in harmony with that demand promises surprising results. Military action has again preempted diplomatic solutions but that need not be permanent. Opportunities still wait if we can muster enough influence to cause a cease-fire.

The first opportunity is for a stronger and more active United Nations to emerge. The united exercise given to the Security Council regarding Iraq has certainly strengthened its muscles. If the military buildup were put under UN command and the UN flag, the breakthrough

for United Nations influence as a respected model of world order would be significant.

Turmoil in the Mid East has been going on for centuries, and against the backdrop of Arab nationalism for decades. The potential for a comprehensive Mid East peace agreement is ripe. Negotiations will be fiery and difficult, but the outcome would make every effort worth while.

Stemming from that may be a wider course of action involving proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are seeing today the beginning of a process that can actually start disposing of nuclear weapons in a responsible and verifiable manner. When we recognize where the nuclear weapons race is leading us -- not just the superpower contest, and not just in the tangible physical realm -- a wide range of choices open for fruitful action. Along with disposing of the nuclear threat, chemical and biological weapons and other means of mass destruction such as fuel-air explosives could also be abolished.

All good things cost. Let us make certain that enough people make the necessary sacrifices -- relinquishing some luxuries and taking time to do a share of the work -- so that we can turn the present turmoil into fulfillment of a dream. Better a little sacrifice now than the blood of our children and grandchildren tomorrow. In many ways Saddam Hussein is a distraction -- the latest of many distractions which keeps us from recognizing our real enemy. Let us examine a few everyday considerations which affect our values.

We of the industrialized and developed world wish to preserve our access to the oil resources in the Mid East. The saying goes that we are addicted to oil. We have now come to the brink of a massive carnage to depose a dictator who supposedly threatens our access to oil. Is oil really our most important value system? What kind of an example are we setting for tomorrow's citizens? There are many ways to reduce our dependency and those means have been stated repeatedly by environmentalists and others who are concerned about depletion of the world's resources and the resulting pollution of everything from the air and water we consume to the protective ozone layer. But more related to the Gulf crisis, reduction of our dependency on oil will make us less trigger-happy in international relations, and more disposed to harmony with other people. America and most other industrialized countries need a responsible energy policy.

In this paper I have outlined the Persian Gulf war and conditions which led up to it. I have also summarized solutions offered by many insightful people. The rest is up to the citizens of this country and of the world. If we want a harmonious environment for ourselves and generations to come, it is within reach. But we'll have to start reaching.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Arab Cooperative Council
AFB	Air Force Base
Aramco	Arabian-American Oil Company
AWACS	Airborne Warning And Command System
b/d	Barrels per day
BNL	Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
CBW	Chemical and Biological Warfare
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EC	European Community
F	Fahrenheit
FAE	Fuel-Air Explosives
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCC	Gulf Cooperative Council
HP	Hewlett Packard
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
Joint-STARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
mm	Millimeter(s)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
Tapline	Trans-Arabian Pipe Line
TDG	Technology and Development Group
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USS	United States Ship
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

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
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


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
APPENDIX B

MAP OF THE ARAB WORLD



APPENDIX C

MAP OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION



APPENDIX D

GENERAL MAP OF IRAQ  
(Provinces and Major Cities)





APPENDIX E

MILITARY SITES IN IRAQ



APPENDIX F  
BUBIYAN AND WARBA ISLANDS

